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Each successfully completed M&A transaction generates lucrative income opportunities to specific 
parties involved in deal-making due to compensation mechanisms linked to the transaction value. In 
theory, this transactional channel of M&A activity might relate to income inequality. The main 
objective of this study is to provide the first empirical analysis on the relationship between M&A and 
income shares at the very top of the income distribution. Using an unbalanced panel design with 
country-year observations from 46 countries allows exploiting cross-sectional along with temporal 
variation. Methodologically, the Driscoll and Kraay estimator is applied as it is heteroskedasticity-
consistent and robust to nonparametric forms of serial and cross-sectional dependence. This study finds 
statistical evidence for a positive and non-linear association pattern between changes in M&A activity 
and changes in top income shares, indicating pro-rich effects. Additionally, periods of systematic 
banking crises significantly intensify the relationship between M&A activity and increasing income 
concentration. 
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Section 1 | Introduction 
In recent decades, the evolution of income inequality has been driven by high growth at the very 
top of the income distribution in many advanced economies of the developed world. (Atkinson et al., 
2011). This increase has been particularly striking in the United States, with the top percentile of income 
earners almost having doubled their income share from 10.3% in 1980 to 18.7% in 2019.2 Parallel to 
this, the CEO-to-worker compensation ratio measured for the top 350 firms in the United States climbed 
sharply to 278-to-1 in 2018, compared to a more equally balanced ratio of 20-to-1 in 1965 (Mishel and 
Wolfe, 2019).3 They also find that the inflation-adjusted CEO compensation under consideration in the 
given sample from 1978 to 2014 skyrocketed and rose by 940.3% compared to the slow 11.9% growth 
of the average worker’s compensation over the same period. Such analytical insights about these long-
term trends have not only fuelled debates on income inequality per se but might have fostered more and 
more people to conceive today’s high CEO compensations as social unjust. Given that and the fact that 
“top incomes represent a small share of the population but a very significant share of total income” 
(Atkinson et al., 2011, p.3), it appears no longer surprising why distributional concerns are at the centre 
of economic and political discussions, putting forward the question which impact factors cause top 
income shares to rise so disproportionately. 
Empirical research examining potential impact factors of extreme income concentration at the very 
top of the distribution show that financial development, systematic banking crises, economic growth, 
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trade openness and globalization, advances in technology, and the economic activity of the government 
are supposed to play a relevant role (see Roine et al., 2009, Neal, 2013, Dorn and Schinke, 2018). Next 
to the set of economic determinants are several political factors with significant impact, including 
government ideology, the strength of unions, the taxation of top income earners, and investment in 
public tertiary education (see Roine et al., 2009, Scheve and Stasavage, 2009, Neal, 2013, Huber et al. 
2019). However, as these attempts are primarily designed to explore the cross-national variation in the 
rise in top incomes over time identify robust determinants, some other research approach is more 
focused on specifying theoretical channels and their mechanism more precisely. According to Dünhaupt 
(2014) and Flaherty (2015), several financialization indicators show a positive and statistically 
significant correlation to the rise of income inequality in developed OECD countries. In line with these 
results, Godechot (2016) broke down the financial sector effect, concluding that an increase in income 
inequality is mainly driven by a growing volume of stocks traded in national stock exchanges.4 Yet 
another research field investigates the composition of top income earners. For the United States, 
empirical studies provide statistical evidence that professionals in the finance industry are the largest 
group and the main contributor to rising incomes at the top of the distribution (Kaplan and Rauh, 2010, 
Philippon and Reshef, 2012). Other professional groups include top executives like CEOs from 
nonfinancial companies, as well as superstars such as athletes and celebrities (Kaplan and Rauh, 2010). 
Estimates show that around 45% of occupations in the top 1% of income earners are engaged in 
executive management or the financial sector, whereas other highly paid professions such as medical 
practitioners and lawyers account for around 24% (Bakija et al., 2012). Indeed, by 2006, the premium 
of education-adjusted wages for professionals in finance was 50% on average, although showing a 
similar development to other workers until 1990, (Philippon and Reshef, 2012). In addition, they 
document that executives in finance earned between 250% and 300% more than executives in other 
sectors. But how are these large and increasing structural differences in compensation justified? Which 
income opportunities does the financial sector offer to its professionals that others do not or only to a 
smaller extent?  
To answer these questions the axiom of accelerated business growth to maximise shareholder value 
seems to play an important role. In the present era of liberalized and rapidly expanding financial markets, 
the pace at which companies grow has been of higher significance to their shareholders, bringing 
inorganic growth opportunities in form of M&A activity into focus. By nature, M&A transactions aim 
to increase the purchasing company’s revenues and are motivated to obtain a competitive and strategic 
advantage over other relevant market players. To give an example, an acquisition or amalgamation 
could enlarge the acquirer’s market power along the supply chain in terms of price negotiations or could 
enhance product quality through advances in newly acquired technological expertise. Aside from 
frequently explored motives of M&A and long-term macroeconomic consequences of market 
consolidation activities such as market power shifts and the ability to set price premiums, the income 
opportunities related to successful deal completion can be tremendous but though are often neglected 
in literature as a potential determinant that could shape the income distribution at the very top.  
Notwithstanding, it is theorized that the transactional channel of mergers and acquisitions presents 
particularly attractive opportunities for certain professionals at the senior level who facilitate, 
conceptualize, and execute such deals (Short, 2017). This is because compensations are often 
remunerated not on the basis of effort contributed (i.e. hourly charges), but as commissions and bonuses 
calculated as a percentage of the monetary value of the M&A transaction. Professionals involved in 
M&A transactions normally include senior investment bankers, senior lawyers and incentivised top 
executives of the purchasing and target companies. Indeed, in business practice their incomes directly 
either largely depend on transaction size or raise with deal complexity (i.e. due diligence, purchase price 
 
4 Research that elaborates the channel between top income shares and financialization has often only focused 
on classical measures of financial development (or financialization) such as stock market size, stock trading 




negotiation rounds, payment structure etc.). Kaplan and Rauh (2010) show that financial professionals 
involved in deal-making reside among the top income earners by finding that the compensation of 
almost all VC (Venture Capital) and PE (Private Equity) partners in the United States is above the 0.48m 
US dollar threshold necessary to put them in the top 0.5% of the income distribution. Grinstein and 
Hribar (2003) report that about 39% of the acquiring firms reward their CEOs for successful acquisitions, 
further suggesting that deal-related bonus compensations are increasing with deal size. Accordingly, 
higher numbers of completed M&A transactions and higher values of M&A transactions are theorized 
to generate higher incomes for financial and law senior advisors, as well as for top executives involved.  
This study contributes to the literature by being the first systematic approach to empirically 
examine how changes in M&A activity are related to changes in top income shares. By analysing panel 
data, the cross-national along with the temporal variation can be exploited to efficiently help explaining 
the evolution of income inequality at the top of the distribution. One of this study’s advantages is to use 
yearly data which are better suited to analyse volatile variables with enormous annual fluctuations, such 
as M&A and stock market activities, rather than averaged data that would come with sizeable loss of 
variation. The restricted data availability of M&A activity leads to a large N small T panel data 
structure. 5  However, the comprehensive country scope comprises 46 developed and developing 
economies, mostly classified as OECD countries, and enlarges the number of observations to be highly 
competitive in comparison with previous research. To ensure valid statistical inference in presence of 
cross-sectional dependence of unknown form and heteroskedasticity, this study uses a fixed-effects 
OLS regression but employs the Driscoll-Kraay standard error. To verify results, I run regressions on a 
rich set of income inequality measures as dependent variables including top income shares, top income 
share ratios, and Gini coefficients. This is of relevance as the composition of the top decile of the income 
distribution is heterogeneous (Dorn and Schinke, 2018). The results show a positive and non-linear 
relation between M&A activity and the top income shares except for the income share of the next 9% 
of income earners.  
This study also examines other hypotheses related to the behaviour of top income shares in Anglo-
Saxon countries and in periods of systematic banking crises defined by Leaven and Valencia (2018). In 
the literature of top income shares, several studies gathered by Atkinson and Piketty (2007) show 
striking differences of income concentration at the top of the distribution between Anglo-Saxon 
countries and Continental Europe from 1980 and onwards. Whereas Anglo-Saxon countries have 
experienced a surge in income concentration in recent decades, countries in Continental Europe 
displayed either no or modest increases in income concentration. This study is concerned with the 
question why the evolution of top income shares has been different in Anglo-Saxon and other countries, 
and whether M&A activity has influenced the diverging pattern across the two country-groups. I find 
that the distributional effect of M&A activity on top income shares between Anglo-Saxon and other 
countries is not systematically different. However, the effect of M&A activity on the Gini coefficients 
is more pronounced in Anglo-Saxon countries.  
By combining all these factors, this research is expected to be unique and to advance the 
understanding of the relationship between M&A activity and the richer income share groups beyond 
current knowledge. The remainder of this study is structured as follows. The next section introduces the 
theory of the transactional side of M&A in more detail and performs a literature review. The data 
sources and a descriptive analysis are provided in section 3. Section 4 discusses the econometric 
framework. Section 5 presents the results of the panel data estimations, extensions, and robustness tests. 
Finally, section 6 concludes with a discussion of the findings in this study. 
 
 
5 Other studies trying to identify potential determinants of top income shares rely on a large T and small N 
data set to establish robust relationships with top income shares over the long run (see Roine et al., 2009, Neal, 
2013, Huber et al., 2019). 
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Section 2 | Literature & Hypotheses Development 
Economic theory suggests a wide spectrum of economic and political determinants that could be 
eligible to shape income inequality but provides only limited theoretical channels that directly connect 
to the evolution of top income shares. This study, however, focuses on empirically investigating an 
unexplored theoretical channel more specifically linked to the income generation process of the working 
rich at the top of the income pyramid. Thereby, emphasis is put on each M&A’s transactional side and 
income opportunities to a particular group of deal-facilitating intermediaries. The purpose of this section 
is to introduce this new theory developed by Nicholas Short (2017) throughout which M&A activity 
could affect top income shares in the short run. Given the current limitation of theoretical mechanisms 
that are primarily related to effects on top income share over the long run, this channel offers a new 
perspective and could especially add value in understanding direct changes. Further, hypotheses 
development in line with the proposed theory constitutes the analytical field of the first empirical 
investigation in that direction. 
2.1 Traditional View of M&A’s Impact on Income Inequality  
In a dynamic and globally competitive business environment, securing corporate revenue growth 
and competitiveness are the key for generating superior profits demanded by the principles of 
shareholder value maximization. In addition to organically growing a corporate from the inside by 
enhancing core competencies and capabilities in accordance with customer needs (Kling et al., 2009), 
mergers and acquisitions have become a primary strategy to expedite corporate growth rates in order to 
meet investor expectations.6 According to Brock (2005), effective mergers and acquisitions minimize 
the costly time lag in the development of products and other supporting structures associated with 
organic growth, thus immediately gaining competitive advantage without increasing own capacity. 
Motives of undertaking mergers and acquisitions are not solely rooted in achieving comparative 
advantages but can also be of a deeper financial, strategic, or managerial character (Faulkner et al., 
2012). Concerning the first, mergers and acquisitions aim to increase corporate market power and 
shareholder value by taking advantage of economies of scale and scope, and by realizing synergy 
potentials through mutual transfers of knowledge as well as shifts of corporate control towards the 
acquirer (Napier, 1989). The second motive category is related to pursuing the corporate’s 
diversification strategy, performing mergers and acquisitions to increase market shares, extend and 
innovate product portfolio, expand geographically into new markets, or to deal with its own positioning 
in mature or emerging markets (Faulkner et al., 2012, Bower, 2001). M&A activity resonating from the 
third motive is explained by non-rationale and self-serving manager behaviour driven by cognitive 
biases such as managerial hubris or empire-building fantasies (Sudarsanam, 2012, Junni and 
Teerikangas, 2019). 
Emphasis is given to the market power hypothesis owing to its direct link to economies of scale 
and business size. As suggested by (Piesse et al., 2013), market power can be interpreted as a corporate’s 
ability of significantly influencing or controlling volume, pricing and quality of its products and services 
as a direct response to the scale of its operations. M&A activity leads to a substantial reallocation of 
economic activity among corporates, as well as to changes in ownership structures and changes in 
exercisable market power, that in turn might have effects on welfare (Blonigen and Pierce, 2016). 
Indeed, Devos et al. (2009) show empirically that an increasing market power transfers gains from 
mergers and acquisitions towards shareholders. To follow the argument of Brennan (2015), M&A 
activity leads to increasing corporate concentration with larger relative corporate size having an upward 
 
6 Although often used interchangeably, mergers actually refer to the amalgamation of two previously separate 
corporates into one newly joint business entity with broadly equal ownership, whereas an acquisition takes place 
when the (often larger) acquiring corporate purchases the majority of shares of the (smaller) targeted one, or 
specific parts of its business units (Junni and Teerikangas, 2019). Purchasing a corporate’s minority stakes also 
reflects an acquisition process at the end of which the new minority shareholder does not possess complete control 
of the acquired target. 
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effect on redistribution of income. By merging and acquiring, market power concentrates at larger 
corporates, reduces competitive pressures, and in turn translates into enlarged earnings margins, greater 
profits, and increased cash flows (Brennan, 2015). He concludes that higher cash flow levels might 
disproportionally translate into dividends disbursed to capital owners and into compensation paid to top 
executives. Given the unequal distribution of corporate profits, most of the bottom 90% of income 
earners will be potentially being worse off as a result of profitable transactions (Ennis et al., 2017). 
Moreover, monopolistic market power is exercised by setting higher than efficiency prices, thus 
increasing producer surplus at the expense of decreasing consumer surplus, which again benefits the 
class of rentiers (Gans et al., 2019). Indeed, for the case of the US economy, Blonigen and Pierce (2016) 
find empirical evidence for M&A activity to be significantly associated with increasing average price 
markups. 
However, the empirical findings of Zhuang and Griffith (2013) do not document evidence for 
robust effects of cross-border mergers & acquisitions on the income distribution. However, their result 
might most likely be driven by offsetting and differential effects across various income groups at the 
top. By relying on top income shares, this study targets to advance knowledge by disentangling potential 
M&A effects on different income groups at the top of the income pyramid.  
2.2 Introduction of Transactional Effects from M&A as Inequality Driver  
Aside from traditionally conceptualizing M&A activity as a mechanism to accumulate corporate 
profit and exert market power, a focus shift towards the transactional side unveils another theoretical 
explanation about how M&A activity might impact income inequality at the top of the income 
distribution. As recently introduced by Nicholas Short (2017), the transactional side of mergers and 
acquisitions offers lucrative opportunities to generate substantial rewards for certain professionals who 
facilitate, conceptualize, and execute such deals. This is because the compensation of involved 
intermediary advisors is directly aligned with transaction size or increases with deal complexity. 
Beneficiaries include senior intermediaries engaged in investment banking, private equity, and 
corporate law, but also top executives involved in the deal-making process. Indeed, professionals in 
such industries accounted for more than two thirds of income earners residing at the top 0.1% of the US 
labour income distribution in 2005 (Bakija et al., 2012). To start with investment banks, remuneration 
is based on a commission calculated as a percentage of the monetary deal value, with increasing 
transaction size leading to greater profits (Short, 2017). Then, a bonus system unequally divides the 
realized profits to the benefit of a small number of senior partners with equity shares (Folkman et al., 
2007). Nevertheless, another larger tier of non-equity directors or vice presidents just below the partner 
level also receive higher bonus payments tied to performance (Folkman et al., 2007). Further, the 
business model of private equity is built upon raising funds from institutional investors or wealthy 
individuals in order to finance investment in selected private corporates, with the aim to develop, grow 
and finally sell them at a profit a few years later (Kaplan and Strömberg, 2009, Folkman et al., 2007). 
Mergers and acquisitions play a central role in corporate value creation through applied buy and build 
strategies. The compensation of private equity fund managers has three dimensions, consisting on the 
one hand of a management fee that resembles pricing-terms of fund services and is calculated as a 
percentage of the committed capital per year, and on the other of a variable performance-based incentive 
fee derived from overall fund profits, also known as the “carried interest” or “carry” (Kaplan and 
Strömberg, 2009, Metrick and Yasuda, 2010). Charging deal and monitoring fees onto portfolio 
corporates invested reflect the third compensation dimension (Kaplan and Strömberg, 2009). With 
respect to the “carry”, all partnering fund managers are entitled to participate from profits, and in larger 
funds senior investment executives are also eligible to receive parts of the “carry” bonus (Folkman et 
al., 2007). 
For law corporates compensation is not entirely fixed to transaction size, but rather increases more 
flexibly with chargeable hours based on effort contributed. The attorney’s workload relevant to the 
M&A process, such as performing the due diligence or constantly writing contract drafts in response of 
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negotiation progress, surges dramatically with transaction size and deal complexity (Short, 2017). 
Larger law corporates such as Linklaters or CMS Hasche Sigle are designed as partnerships whose 
equity partners (senior attorneys) are formally entitled to all the considerable profits (Folkman et al., 
2007), while non-equity partners primarily rely on salaries.7 
Along the acquisition process, the workload for top executives increases dramatically as they are 
not only in charge of managing the operative business but also to spend substantial resources and efforts 
on forming the transaction. After the successful transaction closing, nearly four out of ten acquiring 
corporates reward their CEOs with a bonus, often remunerated in cash (Grinstein and Hribar, 2004). It 
is notable that evidence suggests M&A bonuses to be larger when transaction size is higher, completion 
time longer and decision-making more complex (Grinstein and Hribar, 2004). Incentives in form of 
bonuses also elevates the compensation for the top executives at the selling side, serving to compensate 
for the additional efforts related to selling process and for countering potentially adverse career 
outcomes, such as job loss following an acquisition (Burns et al., 2017). Furthermore, mergers and 
acquisitions create new tasks and responsibilities for the top executive team of the acquiring corporate, 
including the integration of the new business. Gabaix et al. (2014) show evidence for a positive 
association between corporate size and top executive compensation. Such conditions give rise to 
renegotiate compensation, with the likely outcome of increased CEO compensation after the transaction 
is completed, since M&A activity increases the acquiring corporate’s size (Short, 2017).  
Even though each of these mechanisms stands for a plausible theoretical channel through which 
M&A activity might shape the income distribution at the very top, this paper views them as one channel 
due to the use of aggregated data sets on M&A activity and top income shares. Based on the arguments 
presented above, this study’s first hypothesis formulates as follows:   
Hypothesis 1:  Changes in top income shares are positively associated with changes in  
M&A activity. 
Second, by following the seminal work of Atkinson and Piketty (2007) and Roine et al. (2009), it 
is important to point out differences across the heterogeneous income share groups at the very top. Such 
heterogeneity is rooted in different characteristics of each income share group’s composition, with the 
superrich (top 0.1% and top 1%) typically consisting of a high share of rentiers and executives with 
higher capital incomes. Income of this group is therefore often prone to fluctuations. Whereas the 
income share group of the rich (next 9%) composes of highly salaried and highly skilled workers with 
more stable income sources from their occupations (Roine et al., 2009). Hence, effects of M&A activity 
might be stronger or of less presence across several income share groups. Thus, this study expects:  
Hypothesis 2a:  The impact of M&A activity is different across top income share levels, with  
larger effects at the higher end of the income distribution. 
In that sense, this study also elaborates the widening gap within the top income groups but also 
between the top income groups and the bottom 90%. Therefore, this study examines the effects of M&A 
activity on different income share ratios such as the top-1%-to-next-9%-ratio. An increase in the ratio 
would be considered as pro-rich. The transactional side of M&A is tested as a driver of a widening gap 
in terms of increasing income share ratios. The hypothesis is formulated as:  
Hypothesis 2b:  The influence of M&A activity is pro-rich and represents a channel that 
disproportionally benefits top income earners at the costs of income share groups 
at lower levels. 
 
7 To see an exemplary partnership structure please visit: a) https://cms.law/en/deu/list-of-partners and b) 
https://www.linklaters.com/en/about-us/news-and-deals/news/2019/march/linklaters-announces-33-new-partner-
elections-worldwide  
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Further, the Gini coefficient summarizes the entire income distribution and meets the desirable 
Pigou-Dalton criteria (Haughton and Khandker, 2009). Although showing some shortages such as being 
more sensitive to changes in the middle of the income distribution (Arjona et al., 2003), and the fact 
that very different income distributions can exhibit exactly the same inequality coefficient (Afonso et 
al., 2015), the Gini coefficient is widely used and is an accepted measure to examine combined effects 
from the top and the bottom on inequality.8 This study expects: 
Hypothesis 2c:  Changes in the Gini coefficient show a positive correlation with changes in M&A 
activity, substantiating a pro-income-inequality effect. 
2.3 Are there Dissimilarities between Anglo-Saxon and Other Countries? 
In his theoretical work, Esping-Anderson (1990) mainly distinguishes between liberal welfare 
states (Anglo-Saxon countries) with modest social security transfers and slow progress of social reforms 
due to strongly liberal and free market-based work-ethic norms on the one hand, and corporatist 
conservative welfare states (e.g. Austria, France, Germany) with less obsession of liberalized markets 
efficiency and stronger willingness to grant social rights and family-friendly security transfers on the 
other. 9  Complementary to this, Dorn and Schinke (2018) describe Anglo-Saxon countries as 
traditionally possessing weaker employment protection, weaker trade unions and more decentralised 
wage bargaining, but since the 1980’s they have also been characterized as relying more on high-tech 
companies and the finance sector rather than on manufacturing.10 This is in line with the empirical 
findings coming from Atkinson and Piketty (2007) that shows striking differences of income 
concentration at the top of the distribution between Anglo-Saxon countries and Continental Europe 
from 1980 and onwards. Whereas Anglo-Saxon countries have experienced a surge in income 
concentration in recent decades, countries in Continental Europe and Japan displayed either no or 
merely moderate increases in income concentration. Indeed, Atkinson and Leigh (2013) find that the 
income share of the top percentile shows a higher correlation across Anglo-Saxon countries than the 
combined income share of the next four percentiles. This indicates diverging dynamics especially at the 
top 1% income share level between Anglo-Saxon and other countries. Nevertheless, albeit intensive 
discussions in economic literature (see Piketty and Saez, 2006, Roine et al., 2009, Neal, 2013, Dorn and 
Schinke, 2018), determinants of systematic differences between them have yet been unidentified.11 
The origin of top income generation is fundamentally different in both country-groups. In 
continental Europe or Japan, the prevailing class of top income earners is formed by the rentiers, and 
still relies on capital income flows as primary source of income. Though, in Anglo-Saxon countries, the 
rise of top income shares during the last decades has mainly been driven by large increases in 
compensation of the working rich, including top wages for the best performing executives (Piketty and 
Saez, 2006). In short, the income hierarchy has changed in the United States with the working rich at 
the very top of the income distribution, while capital incomes in the other country-group are still 
predominant.12 
 
8 The Lorenz curve can assume different shapes even when the size of the measured area is the same (Afonso 
et al., 2015). 
9 Esping-Andersen (1990) also describes a third but admittedly small group of social democratic welfare 
states (Scandinavian countries). 
10 In the early 1980s and under the leadership of Reagan and Thatcher, market reforms have been established 
that favour pure market mechanisms and less regulation. 
11 In their work, Roine et al. (2009) argue that the diverging patterns of top income shares between Anglo-
Saxon countries and other developed countries could arise due to market-based or bank-based financial systems. 
However, they failed to find different systematic distributional effects from either economic growth or trade 
openness (Roine et al., 2009). 
12 Theoretical explanations for these sharp increases in top wages relate to increased competition for top 
executives and the removal of free market impediments such as labour market regulations, unions, and social 
norms (Piketty and Saez, 2006). 
Literature & Hypotheses Development 
 
8 
As the transactional channel of M&A is theorized to benefit senior investment bankers and senior 
lawyers in leading or executive positions, as well as incentivised top executives of the purchasing and 
target companies, it might be a potential determinant of top income shares in Anglo-Saxon countries 
with the working rich at the very top of the income pyramid. 13 By interacting the key variables of M&A 
activity with an Anglo-Saxon dummy variable, potentially different systematic distributional effects 
between the two groups can appropriately be analysed. This study expects: 
Hypothesis 3:  The effect of M&A activity on top income shares is more pronounced in Anglo Saxon 
countries than in other countries. 
2.4 The Presence of Systematic Banking Crises and M&A Activity 
One of the major findings reported by Roine et al. (2009) suggests a negative effect on income 
shares of the top 1% stemming from systematic banking crises. Such a result gives rise to the question 
whether the effect of M&A on top income shares different whenever systematic banking crises occur. 
Albeit M&A activity slows down in terms of frequency and valuation levels during times of economic 
downturn, this study assumes that M&A activity might still stably generate and provide enormous 
income opportunities. This is because a crisis offers opportunities to acquire financially weakened 
competitors or even financially sound companies at generally lower valuations that offer higher 
leverage potential in the future. Hence, this study tests: 
Hypothesis 4:  The effect of M&A activity on top income shares is larger in years of systematic 
banking crises and less strong in years of regular economic development.
 
Section 3 | Data & Measurement  
This section explains the key independent and dependent variables included in the subsequent 
analyses, and transparently describes the data measurement of M&A activity. To provide details related 
to the data construction process, the definition and source of each variable as well as the corresponding 
summary statistics are portrayed below.  
3.1 M&A Activity as Key Independent Variable 
Information concerning M&A activity is obtained from Thomson One (www.thomsonone.com), a 
financial database collecting all relevant details of M&A transactions around the globe, and often 
referred to in empirical research (see Harford, 2005, Gugler et al., 2012).14 This paper focuses on 
completed M&A deals with a transaction value of at least one million US Dollar. Based on a plethora 
of more than 328,000 reported M&A transactions that meet these two criteria, annual deal value 
aggregates are calculated to exploit country-year M&A activity.15 The specification of M&A activity 
includes mergers, acquisitions, tender and exchange offers, as well as equity carveouts. Excluded are 
uncoordinated open market repurchases which do not necessarily rely on involvement of expensive 
intermediaries. Loan modifications are also excluded as these have rather the character of a financial 
 
13 The pattern of the working rich residing within the top 1% is primarily observed in the United States. The 
United Kingdom and the other four Anglo-Saxon countries tend to be between the characterized patterns of the 
United States and Continental Europe (Atkinson and Piketty, 2007). 
14 M&A data at the transaction level is most often only collected by private data organisations and not 
available at governmental institutions. Aside from deals conducted by publicly listed companies at the stock 
markets, not all privately executed M&A activity is always reported and made available to the public. Hence, the 
Thomson One database provides a comprehensive and reliable M&A data collection that mirrors real M&A 
activity but cannot be considered as being complete.  
15 Initial amount of M&A data was ca. 865,800 of which around 492,800 transactions did not report a 
transaction value, and another 44,600 only a had negligible transaction value below one million USD. 
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service with a payment structure for intermediaries that is not necessarily linked to the underlying loan 
volume.  
Each transaction usually involves professional advisors on both sides, known as sell-side and buy-
side teams. For intra-country M&A deals, it seems reasonable to assume that the acquiring and selling 
party primarily engage the services of domestic intermediaries to successfully complete a transaction. 
Fees paid to both advising teams, can thus be fully accounted for an impact on the domestic income 
distribution. In contrast to this plausible case, cross-border mergers and acquisitions need a more careful 
consideration. The target company might prefer to work with an experienced sell-side team with related 
industry knowledge, high expertise in the domestic market, company prices and valuations, and the 
juridical environment. From a practical perspective, a strong cultural fit, a wide interconnected network, 
geographical vicinity, and the absence of language barriers are also an advantage when hiring a 
domestic sell-side team. The same reasons are likely to influence the choice of the acquiring company 
in favour of their respective buy-side team. Hence, fees received from cross-border M&A deals are 
likely to affect the income distribution in the domestic and the foreign country, respectively. Built on 
these assumptions, transaction values of interconnected cross-border M&A deals are equally split 
between the countries involved.16 The primary variable of interest is the relative M&A activity that 
expresses the country-year transaction value as a share of GDP to account for overall economic cycle 
developments and size of the economy.  
3.2 Top Income Shares as Dependent Variable 
Atkinson and Piketty (2007) provide evidence for a very heterogenous dispersion of income even 
within the top decile of income earners. Following their rationale, this paper examines top income 
earners at different levels, defining the top 0.1% and the top 1% of income earners as narrow and broader 
group of the superrich while determining the bottom nine percentiles of the top decile (P90-99), also 
called the next 9%, as the rich.17 The share of the bottom nine deciles presents income of the remaining 
population. Further, to obtain a comprehensive picture of the distributive consequences of M&A 
activity, this paper does not only estimate potential effects on top income shares at different levels but 
also on income share ratios. The latter one relates income shares to each other, like the “top 1% to next 
9%” income share ratio ((P90-P99)/P99), thus measuring the distribution of income directly within the 
top income share groups. Pro-rich effects on income due to M&A would be described by a positive 
relationship between M&A activity and both top income shares and income share ratios, respectively.  
Data related to income shares and ratios is taken from the World Inequality Database (WID, 
www.wid.world) and refers to pre-tax and transfer income. The WID provides a systematic framework 
to derive income share data from different data sources, including national income accounts, household 
income surveys and fiscal data from taxes on income.18 
In addition, the most frequently applied measures of economic inequality, the disposable income 
and market income Gini coefficients, are used to estimate the impact of M&A activity on overall 
economic inequality.19 A positive relationship would be interpreted as inequality-increasing effects. For 
the Gini coefficients, the data is retrieved from the Standardized World Income Inequality Database 
(SWIID, www.fsolt.org/swiid/).  
 
 
16 A pure target company approach would ignore the cross-border M&A activity of domestic acquirers 
abroad, and hence underestimate the potential effects on the income distribution in country’s whose companies 
acquire foreign companies (M&A outflow). Further, the potential effect on the income distribution would be 
overestimated in countries whose companies are acquired by foreign companies (M&A inflow).  
17 Roine et al. (2009) define the top 1% income share as “the rich”, the next 9% within the top decile of the 
income distribution as “the upper middle class”, and the bottom 90% of income earners as “the rest”. 
18 See official website (https://wid.world/methodology/#library-working-papers), accessed on 27/11/2020. 
19 The market income Gini Coefficient reflects pre-tax and transfer income. 
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3.3 Control Variables and Overview of Variables  
The review of previous empirical research results and economic theories has identified a set of 
potential determinants for rising top income shares. These explanatory control variables need to be 
specified by using sourced data. While data availability of M&A activity constraints the time horizon 
and length of the panel, data on top income shares define the limitation of country coverage and thus 
the panel data’s width. Given these constraints, the panel data set is of unbalanced nature to maximize 
the number of observations. However, variables related to technological change and top income tax 
rates show many missing observations and further restrict the sample size. Thus, this study constructs 
a baseline equation and starts the analysis by relying on measures with complete annual data availability 
to stabilize the sample size, and to exploit data variation from them. If all variables were entered in only 
one equation, the analysis would be left with only a small fraction of observations. Entering variables 
with related loss of observations remains meaningful to the robustness analysis in terms of examining 
additional theoretical channels and validating robustness of the formerly included variables.  
Operational definitions, original data sources and the hypothesized relation to top income shares 
for all used variables are provided in table 1. For the purpose of this study, economic development is 
defined as the logarithm of GDP per capita in constant 2010 US dollar, and as such it controls for any 
distributional effect due to different income levels. The main variable to capture effects of financial 
development is the stock market capitalization measured as market value of publicly listed stocks as a 
percentage of GDP. Due to high annual financial market-based fluctuations, this measure is well suited 
to analyzing data variation in the short run. This variable also represents income opportunities from 
dividends and therefore is the primary measure of market-based financial development in this study. 
Additionally, the variable of private credit measures the bank-based financial development. In the 
robustness analysis, both measures are combined as a measure of total financial development. To access 
effects of the level of government involvement in the economy, the final government consumption 
expenditures as a share of GDP is used. As demographic changes could also impact the income 
distribution, the age dependency ratio is the preferred measure since it has the advantage to directly 
relate the share of working population with the share of dependent non-productive population. This 
more precisely captures the influence of income inequality rather than sheer population size. Data for 
all these variables are retrieved from the World Bank (www.data.worldbank.org). 
For measuring trade openness, this study first applies a standard de facto measure that is the sum 
of exports and imports of goods and services as share of GDP. An alternative way to measure openness 
is to use a sub-indicator of the KOF globalization index for trade weighted by several de facto (i.e. trade 
partner diversity) and de jure (i.e. trade regulations and trade agreements) variables. On a scale from 
one to one hundred, higher index values show greater trade globalization. Data is obtained from the 
KOF Swiss Economic Institute (www.kof.ethz.ch/en). The unemployment rate accounts for shifts in 
market power resources. It relates unemployment persons to total workforce and is drawn from the 
International Monetary Fund (www.imf.org/en/Data).  
The next potential determinants with effects on the income distributions are technology change 
and top income taxes. I follow Roine et al. (2009) and apply two alternative proxies that are the 
agricultural share and the logarithmized number domestic patent applications of residents and non-
residents. Both are not added to the baseline equation as their inclusion translates into a loss of 
observations.20 Consequently, both are solely used to control for technology change in the robustness 
check analysis. To proxy top income tax rates, this paper follows Piketty (2014) and Neal (2013) and 
uses the top statutory tax rate sourced from the OECD (www.data.oecd.org) for the period from 2000 
to 2016. Given this decisive data constraint, this measure is only applied in the robustness check 
analysis. Other determinants potentially contributing to changes in income inequality are binary dummy 
variables for years of systematic banking crises and for the government ideology of the ruling party.  
 
20 The top statutory income tax rate is only measured from 2000 to 2016. 
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3.4 Descriptive Statistics 
Table 2 presents the summary statistics of all variables used in the specification of the baseline 
equation and in sensitivity analyses. By starting to describe statistics related to the set of dependent 
variables, the combined mean values for the bottom 90%, the next 9% and the top 1% approximately 
add up to one, even though the number of observations slightly differ from each other. Put together 
these variables represent the entire income distribution. Interestingly, the standard deviations grow 
larger relative to their respective means, the closer the income share defines income earners at the very 
top. For example, whereas a one standard deviation from the mean of 36.7% of the top 10% income 
share is 22.9% (or around 8.4 percentage points), an equivalent dispersion from the mean of 12.3% of 
the top percentile of income earners is about 39.0% (4.8 percentage points).21 Thus, top income shares 
seem to exhibit relatively more year-to-year variation than other income share measures further down 
the distribution. As expected, Gini coefficients based on disposable income are consistently lower than 
the ones based on market income, signifying that on average the redistribution of income reduces 
inequality by 0.13 Gini coefficient points. 
 
21 The pattern also applies to the top 0.1% income share where a one standard deviation from the mean of 
around 4.4% is 52.3% (or around 2.3 percentage points). 
Table 1. Variable definitions and sources   
    Definition Original Data Source 
Dependent Variables   
Inequality Measures I. (Shares)   
Top 0.1% Income Share Income share accruing to the top 0.1% of earners (P99.9-100) World Inequality 
Database 
Top 1% Income Share Income share accruing to the top 1% of earners (P99-100) World Inequality 
Database 
Next 9% Income Share Income share of the earners with the highest 10% less the top 1% share (P90-99) World Inequality 
Database 
Bottom 90% Income Share Income share earned by those with the 90% lowest incomes (P0-P90) World Inequality 
Database 
Inequality Measures II. (Ratios)   
Top 1% to Next 9%Ratio Income share of the top 1% divided by income share of the next nine percentiles 
under the top 1 percentile 
Own Calculation based 
on WID 
Top 1% to Bottom 90% Ratio Income share of the top 1% divided by income share of the bottom 90% Own Calculation based 
on WID 
Inequality Measures III. (Gini)   
Disposable Income Gini Gini coefficient for disposable income inequality, post taxes and transfers SWIID, Vers. 8.0 
Market Income Gini Gini coefficient for market income inequality, pre-taxes and transfers SWIID, Vers. 8.0 
M&A Independent Variables   
Relative M&A Activity Aggregated transaction value as percentage of GDP Thomson One, World 
Bank 
Log Real Transaction Value Aggregated nominal transaction value divided by the consumer price index, 
logarithmized 
Thomson One, World 
Bank 
Number of Transactions Aggregated number of M&A transactions Thomson One 
Control Variables   
Economic Development Real GDP per capita (in constant 2010 US dollar), logarithmized World Bank 
Financialization   
(a) Stock Market Capitalization Market capitalization of listed domestic companies as percentage of GDP World Bank 
(b) Private Credit  Private credit by deposit money banks and other financial institutions as percentage 
of GDP  
World Bank 
(c) Financial Development Total capitalization defined as sum of private credit and stock market capitalization   
Economic Globalization   
(a) Trade Openness Sum of exports and imports of goods and services as percentage of GDP World Bank 
(b) Trade Globalization Index Weighted percentage index comprising de facto and de jure measures regrading 
trade regulations, agreements and volumes, tariffs, trade partner diversity  
KOF Globalization 
Index, ETH Zurich 
     Government Spending National accounts general final government consumption expenditures as 
percentage of GDP (sum of collective consumption goods, services, and employee 
compensation)  
World Bank 
     Market Power Resources Number of unemployed persons as percentage of total labour force International Monetary 
Fund 
     Demography Ratio of dependents (people younger than 15 or older than 64) to the working-age 
population (those ages 15-64) 
World Bank 
Technology Change   
(a) Agricultural Share Agricultural production as percentage of GDP (including forestry, hunting, fishing, 
cultivation of crops, and livestock production) 
World Bank 
(b) Patent Applications Patent applications of residents filed through the Patent Cooperation Treaty 
procedure or with a national patent office for exclusive rights for an invention, 
logarithmized 
World Bank 
Banking Crises Dummy variable for years of systematic banking crises Worldbank 
Government Ideology Dummy variable representing the ideology of a government (ruling political party) Database of Political 
Institutions (2017) 
Top Income Tax Rate Top statutory income tax rate OECD 
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Turning to the key independent variable, relative M&A activity has a mean of 4.6%, ranging from 
0% if there is no deal in a specific country-year observation to a maximum of 395.0%, a value almost 
four times larger than that country-year’s GDP.22 When describing the summary statistics for Anglo-
Saxon countries only, the mean of the relative M&A activity amounts to higher levels of around 7.4%. 
Quantitatively, the magnitude of dispersion is lower compared to the one obtained from the entire 
country set. With regards to the binary dummy variables, systematic banking crises and their ripple 
effects occurred in about 11.3% of the country-year pairs and parties with left-orientated ideology ruled 
in 41.6% of country-years. 
Table 2 Summary Statistics for main Variables 
     Obs.   Mean   Std. Dev.   min   max 
Dependent Variables      
 0.1% Top Income Share 1,420 0.0438 0.0228 0.0054 0.1648 
 1% Top Income Share 1,420 0.1231 0.0475 0.0363 0.3204 
 Next 9% Top Income Shares 1,408 0.2445 0.0457 0.1530 0.4587 
 10% Top Income Shares 1,408 0.3667 0.0838 0.1965 0.6508 
 Ratio Top 1% to Next 9% 1,408 0.1765 0.0810 0.0272 0.7417 
 Ratio Top 1% to Bottom 90% 1,403 0.2096 0.1245 0.0474 0.8472 
 Gini coefficient (disposable) 1,429 0.3363 0.0850 0.2050 0.6350 
 Gini coefficient (market) 1,429 0.4680 0.0600 0.3070 0.7250 
Key Independent Variable      
 Relative M&A Activity (all) [in % of GDP] 1,489 0.0461 0.1154 0.0000 3.9503 
 Relative M&A Activity (Anglo-Saxon) [in % of GDP] 222 0.0744 0.0517 0.0009 0.3332 
Control Variables (Baseline)      
 Stock Market Capitalization [in % of GDP] 1,284 0.6087 0.5324 0.0001 3.2836 
 Real GDP per capita [in US Dollar] 1,489 28,472.32 21,791.31 505.18 111,968.40 
 Government Spending [in % of GDP] 1,479 0.1764 0.0441 0.0091 0.2794 
 Trade Volume [in % of GDP] 1,481 0.8493 0.6587 0.1258 4.3733 
 Unemployment Rate 1,430 0.0752 0.0463 0.0000 0.2905 
 Age Dependency Ratio 1,493 0.5084 0.0818 0.2699 0.8859 
Control Variables (Robustness Check)      
 Systematic Banking Crises [Binary Dummy, 0 = no crisis] 1,401 0.1128 0.3164 0.0000 1.0000 
 Private Credit [in % of GDP] 1,384 0.7217 0.4168 0.0425 2.6070 
 Financial Development [in % of GDP] 1,273 1.3362 0.8014 0.0567 4.4527 
 KOF Trade Globalization Index 1,249 62.58 17.66 17.34 96.97 
 Government Ideology [Binary Dummy, 0 = left] 1,116 0.4158 0.4931 0.0000 1.0000 
 Agriculture Share [in % of GDP] 1,337 0.0497 0.0538 0.0003 0.3697 
 Top Statutory Income Tax Rate 660 0.4277 0.1039 0.1500 0.6228 
 Patent Applications [number of patents] 1,359 24,772.48 94,588.12 4.00 1,393,815.00 
 
 
Section 4 | Econometric Estimation 
To investigate the impact of M&A activity on the distribution of income at the very top, this study 
utilizes an unbalanced panel design with country-year observations for 46 countries from 1979 to 2017. 
The unevenly distributed data availability across countries and across the set of income inequality 
measures constraints the cross-sectional unit dimension N. Further, the data collection process on M&A 
activity restricts the time dimension T as it only dates back until the early 1980’s. Although improving 
the efficiency of econometric estimates and accurate inference of model parameters, panel data 
estimations are characterized by more complex error structures (Hsiao, 2014, Baltagi, 2005).23 These 
complications might violate standard OLS assumptions about the error process, including those that all 
errors should have the same variance and presumably exhibit cross-sectional and temporal 
independency of unknown form.  
Indeed, conventional testing methods performed on the underlying sample confirm the presence of 
heteroskedasticity and cross-sectional dependence (see appendix A.II.). Erroneously ignoring standard 
error correlation over time and between units can lead to biased statistical inference (Hoechle, 2007). 
For valid statistical inference, this study employs the Driscoll-Kraay estimator that produces standard 
 
22  The observation refers to Luxembourg 2015. The second to the fourth largest values also relate to 
Luxembourg but show lower values ranging between 48-52% in terms of GDP.  
23 For a detailed discussion on the benefits of using panel data please see Baltagi (2005) and Hsiao (2014). 
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errors consistent to general forms of cross-sectional and temporal dependence, without the necessity of 
parametrically specifying the exact correlation structures of the standard errors without prior knowledge 
about them.24 Driscoll and Kraay (1998) show that their nonparametric standard error correction method 
constructs a consistent covariance matrix estimator that is independent of the cross-sectional unit 
dimension N. Thereby, the Driscoll-Kraay estimator remedies the deficiencies and restrictions of other 
estimators with large-T asymptotics.25 The Driscoll-Kraay estimator assumes a heteroskedastic error 
structure and can handle an unbalanced data set with N > T.  
Mindful of issues related to the presence of non-stationarity, calculating the first difference is 
applied to stabilize the mean over time, and to transform a unit root variable in levels into a stationary 
variable in differences.26 Each variable is differenced once over time, at the cost of reducing the time 
dimension of the panel data by one year, to alleviate the risk of spurious regression results. Thus, it is 
worth highlighting that this study effectively analyses and estimates the relationship between changes 
of variables rather than between their levels. 
An additional source of potential biasedness of the estimation coefficients refers to endogeneity 
issues in form of unobserved heterogeneity. In fact, observable and unobservable factors which are 
summed up in the error term could be correlated with variables included in the regression model so that 
omitted variable bias would result. To address endogeneity issues stemming from observed time-
varying omitted variable bias, a qualified set of control variables is included to effectively minimize 
such a potential bias of the estimation coefficients. Nevertheless, unobserved time-invariant 
heterogeneity across countries rooted in non-measurable differences in social and cultural norms, 
history, psychological and irrational behaviour patterns, or formal institutions could remain as an origin 
of omitted variable bias. This is solved for by applying a fixed-effects estimator which eliminates any 
time-invariant effects due to soaking up all between country variation. Instead, the fixed-effects 
estimation method focuses on obtaining multiple observations of each country, and on analysing the 
variation within countries.27 According to De Hoyos and Sarafidis (2006), the fixed-effects estimator 
remains consistent when plausibly assuming that the cross-sectional dependence is caused by the 
presence of unobserved common factors which are uncorrelated with the included explanatory variables. 
In addition, the inclusion of year fixed-effects accounts for the potential influence coming from time 
trends and temporal shocks such as economic growth spurts or recessions. Unlike Roine et al. (2009) 
or Scheve and Stavasage (2009) who rely on five-year averaged data with focus on relationships over 
the long run, the year dummies used in this study correspond to the underlying annual data.28  
In summary, this study uses a fixed-effects regression model with Driscoll and Kraay standard 
errors that are robust to heteroskedasticity and cross-sectional and temporal dependence. The estimation 
analysis starts with the following proposed baseline model specification:  
 
24 The number of lags used for the estimation of the Driscoll-Kraay covariance matrix is defined by applying 
a simple heuristic proposed in Newey and West (1994) that is [4(T/100)2/9] also known as “Bartlett”.  
25 To better understand the conceptional advantage of the Driscoll-Kraay estimator in comparison to other 
alternative estimators please see appendix A.III.. This explains why the Driscoll-Kraay estimator is preferred. 
26 According to Breuer et al. (2002), panel unit root testing methodologies are restricted by their respective 
rejection definition of the null hypothesis that only allows the conclusion that at least one panel is stationary. 
Researchers are left without information on how many, or even which panels are stationary. Thus, this paper 
investigates the presence of stationarity based on separate analysis of each panel. Results are reported in appendix 
A.IV.. 
27 Theoretically, the FE-estimator does not completely eradicate potential omitted variable bias. This would 
be the case when unobservable time-varying factors within each country would correlate with the explanatory 
variables. This study does not deny the possibility that some uncontrolled factors might affect both the dependent 
variable and the respective independent variables. 
28 As the theoretical mechanism of interest is working directly in a short-run framework, long periods of 
more than three or five years would be an imprecise measure when top income shares and M&A activity would 
change in the meantime. Additionally, Dorn and Schinke (2018) argue that results based on averaged data might 
be sensitive to the choice of the starting year. 
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𝛥𝑦𝑖𝑡 = 𝛼0 + 𝛽𝛥𝑥𝑖𝑡 + 𝛾
′𝛥𝑍𝑖𝑡 + 𝛿𝑡 + 𝜇𝑖 + 𝑖𝑡   (1) 
In the above-presented equation, 𝑦  presents the dependent variable of the respective income 
inequality measure for country i in year t. The main dependent variable of interest is the top income 
share at the one percent level. The measure of M&A activity defines the key variable 𝑥𝑖𝑡. Z is a vector 
that represents the basic set of control variables formerly identified as other determinants of top income 
shares, including real GDP per capita (log), stock market capitalization, government spending, trade 
volume, the age dependency ratio, and the unemployment rate. 29 Further, country- and year-specific 
effects are modelled by 𝜇𝑖 and 𝛿𝑡, respectively. 
The model assumption of a linear relationship between x and y might impose a restriction which 
is too narrowly defined so that the analysis also includes testing of non-linearities in the data by adding 
a squared term of M&A activity to the baseline equation. In that case the adjusted model and the 
marginal effect of M&A activity on the dependent variable can be expressed as follows:  
𝛥𝑦𝑖𝑡 = 𝛼0 + 𝛽1𝛥𝑥𝑖𝑡  +  𝛽2(𝛥𝑥𝑖𝑡)
2 + 𝛾′𝛥𝑍𝑖𝑡 + 𝛿𝑡 + 𝜇𝑖 + 𝑖𝑡   (2) 
𝛿𝐸(𝛥𝑦𝑖𝑡)
𝛿𝛥𝑥𝑖𝑡
= 𝛽1+ 2𝛽2𝛥𝑥𝑖𝑡   (3) 
Before moving on to the next section, some cautionary remarks regarding this study’s empirical 
estimation limitations are warrantable. Albeit controlling for common trends and time-invariant country 
factors, another potential source of endogeneity that is simultaneity cannot be fully eradicated. For 
example, Roine et al. (2009) consider the possibility that individuals located at the top of the income 
distribution could be capable of exploiting financial market opportunities more profitably. In that case 
top income shares would affect the development of stock market capitalization and the strict exogeneity 
assumption of a relevant control variable would be violated. According to Wintoki et al. (2012), the 
dynamic GMM model provides consistent results in the presence of various endogeneity sources 
including simultaneity. Nevertheless, given the presence of cross-sectional dependence in the error 
structure in a short panel, dynamic GMM estimation methods are inconsistent (Sarafidis and Robertson, 
2009). This is because the large-N asymptotics of these estimators rely on the crucial assumption that 
errors are uncorrelated across cross-sectional units (Sarafidis and Robertson, 2009). As the existence of 
cross-sectional dependence has been confirmed by conventional testing and the issue of simultaneity is 
only based on theoretical ground, this study gives priority to correct for the former. As a consequence, 
issues of potential simultaneity remain unsolved so that all results subsequently presented in the next 
section should be interpreted as associations between the variables of interest rather than causal effects. 
Despite this limitation, this study contributes to existing literature by being the first systematic approach 
to investigate the relationship between the transactional side of M&A and top income shares by 
exploiting panel data.  
 
Section 5 | Results & Robustness Analyses 
This section starts with the presentation of results obtained from the baseline equation specification 
and moves on investigating non-linear relationship patterns and potential differential effects in Anglo-
Saxon and other countries. The results are complemented by applied robustness analyses to substantiate 
associations between the variables of primary interest.  
 
 
29 Some control variables are added or substituted by similar measures when performing robustness checks. 
For example, measures of top marginal income taxation and a proxy for technological progress are added, while 
the KOF globalization index serves as an alternative proxy for globalization instead of trade volume. 
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5.1 Results  
5.1.1    Main Results 
For ease of comparability and to efficiently investigate the validity of the first hypothesis and the 
hypotheses formulated under two, the preferred estimation method is used to perform a series of 
regressions with varying income inequality measures as dependent variables. Table 3 looks at the effects 
of M&A activity on top income shares (column one to four), income share ratios (column five and six), 
and Gini coefficients (column seven and eight). All coefficients possess a positive sign which provides 
a first indication of the existence of a positive association between income inequality and M&A activity, 
even though not all of them are statistically significant.  
Table 3 FE OLS Model with Driscoll and Kraay standard errors  
Regression #   (1)   (2)   (3)   (4)   (5)   (6)   (7)   (8) 
Dependent Variable Δ Top 0.1% 
Income 
Share 
Δ Top 1% 
Income 
Share 
Δ Next 9% 
Income 
Share 
Δ Top 10% 
Income 
Share 
Δ Ratio Top 
1% to Next 
9% 









Key Independent Variable          
Δ rel. M&A Activity 0.00106* 0.00202* 0.00021 0.00226* 0.00983* 0.00351* 0.00030 0.00019 
(0.00062) (0.00105) (0.00050) (0.00125) (0.00537) (0.00183) (0.00029) (0.00017) 
Control Variables          
Δ Stock Market 
Capitalization 
0.00847** 0.01314** -0.00007 0.01289** 0.06010** 0.02404** 0.00148*** 0.00109 
(0.00415) (0.00583) (0.00145) (0.00532) (0.02845) (0.01147) (0.00047) (0.00065) 
Δ log real GDP per 
capita 
0.02525*** 0.03065** -0.02062 0.00976 0.15570*** 0.04879 -0.01216** -0.01492*** 
(0.00640) (0.01414) (0.01823) (0.03084) (0.03856) (0.03863) (0.00505) (0.00455) 
Δ Government 
Spending 
-0.10156*** -0.17360*** 0.01073 -0.18954*** -0.88077*** -0.37750*** -0.00699 0.00136 
(0.02865) (0.03542) (0.03966) (0.04071) (0.20572) (0.06612) (0.00705) (0.00776) 
Δ Unemployment Rate 0.00452 0.00095 -0.00150 0.00078 -0.00341 -0.00290 0.02585*** 0.04212*** 
(0.01010) (0.01748) (0.01910) (0.03214) (0.05744) (0.04245) (0.00843) (0.01433) 
Δ Trade Volume 0.00101 0.00489 0.00158 0.00603 0.00769 0.01138 -0.00154 -0.00030 
(0.00331) (0.00492) (0.00625) (0.00948) (0.01962) (0.01188) (0.00105) (0.00085) 
Δ Age Dependency 
Ratio 
-0.00774 -0.02609 -0.09309 -0.12350 0.10761 -0.08123 -0.04471 -0.01724 
(0.04326) (0.07433) (0.05744) (0.09463) (0.32568) (0.15503) (0.03196) (0.04095) 
Constant 0.00211*** 0.00256** -0.00220*** 0.00026 0.01678*** 0.00310 0.00322*** 0.00037 
(0.00062) (0.00103) (0.00073) (0.00126) (0.00458) (0.00217) (0.00065) (0.00080) 
Observations 1159 1159 1147 1147 1147 1142 1215 1215 
R-squared (within) 0.08534 0.10678 0.03913 0.09178 0.11263 0.08188 0.12417 0.19601 
Country fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Time fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Notes: Driscoll and Kraay standard errors are in parentheses *** p<.01, ** p<.05, * p<.1 
In line with hypothesis one, the relationship between the estimation coefficients of M&A activity 
and three out of four top income share measures is positive and statistically significant at the 10% 
significance level. The group of the next 9% of income earners constitutes to be without any relevant 
effect, confirming the prevalence of variation patterns of the top 0.1% and top 1% income shares in 
forming the income share group of the top decile. In support of hypothesis two (part a), the estimated 
effects are different in magnitude across the top income share measures. When putting in context of 
respective mean values, the pro-rich impact of M&A activity grows larger for income shares closer to 
the top of the income distribution. Regarding the income share ratios, there is evidence for income share 
shifts from the next 9% and the bottom 90% to the more affluent income earners at the very top. This 
would suggest that the superrich have benefitted disproportionally in times of higher M&A activity – a 
result in line with hypothesis two (part b). Further, there is no statistical evidence for an impact on the 
Gini coefficients, indicating a lack of confirmation for hypothesis two (part c) that theorized an 
inequality increasing effect coming from M&A activity. Putting all results together, M&A activity 
demonstrates to be pro-rich in the short run.  
Findings related to financial development and economic growth have a positive and statistically 
significant association with the top income shares and income share ratios, supporting previous 
empirical results (see Roine et al., 2009). Indeed, financial development and economic growth validate 
to be pro-rich, although the latter one is linked with reducing inequality measured by the Gini 
coefficients and hence not enforcing overall income inequality levels. Additionally, increasing 
government spending seems to be an efficient policy to reduce top 1% and top 10% income share levels, 
and to reduce the distribution of income from the income share group of the next 9% to earners residing 
within the top 1%. Other control variables seem to be of lower relevance and only allow limited 
statistical inference, with the unemployment rate being positively related to both Gini coefficients. 
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Trade is statistically insignificant but with a positive sign that, if all, could be beneficial for income 
earners within the top income shares. Results for the age dependency ratio are insignificant with an 
unexpected negative sign.  
With regards to economic significance and effect size, a one-percentage point increase in relative 
M&A activity resonates with a rise of 0.00202 percentage points in the top 1% income share. Applied 
to the mean annual change in M&A activity, which is around 2.9 percentage points, the top 1% income 
share is expected to increase by 0.048%. Quantitatively, such a magnitude could be misleadingly 
interpreted as diminutive as it lacks accounting for the volatile behaviour of the M&A variable. Indeed, 
changes by two standard deviations might present more appropriately present the underlying patterns 
of annual changes. When incorporating the high volatility, the impact of M&A activity surges to 
economically meaningful levels. Table 4 compares the impact of M&A activity, stock market 
capitalization and government spending on the top 1% income share and the top 1% to next 9% income 
share ratio. 
Table 4 Effect Size Comparison of Selected Independent Variables on Top 1% Income Share and the Top 1% to 
Next 9% Income Share Ratio in Two Case Scenarios  
 Mean Change Change by two standard deviations 
Definition of  
the X variable 
Change of X 
(in PP) 
Change of Y 
(in PP) 
Change of Y 
(in %) 
Change of X 
(in PP) 
Change of Y 
(in PP) 
Change of Y 
(in %) 
Set A – Top 1% Income Share 
M&A Activity 2.92 0.0059 0.048% 28.371 0.0573 0.466% 
Stock Market Cap. 9.04 0.118 0.965% 22.682  0.298 2.421% 
Govern. Spending 0.54 -0.094 -0.763% 1.328 -0.230 -1.872% 
Set B - Top 1% to Next 9% Income Share Ratio  
M&A Activity 2.92 0.0287 0.162% 28.371 0.279 1.580% 
Stock Market Cap. 9.04 0.543 3.079% 22.682  1.363 7.723% 
Govern. Spending 0.54 -0.477 -2.701% 1.328 -1.169 -6.625% 
Notes: The abbreviation PP denotes percentage points as a unit to measure changes. The mean value of each selected independent variables is the basis to calculate the percentual change. 
Two different scenarios are created. The first refers to the quantitative effects of a mean annual 
change in each independent variable. The second scenario applies a two standard deviation change to 
estimate the influence of M&A activity, respectively. A change of this magnitude correlates with a rise 
in the top 1% income share by almost 0.5%. As expected, accounting for volatility substantially reduces 
the large differences in the estimated coefficient sizes between M&A activity and government spending. 
For an annual mean change, the effect of government spending on the top 1% income share is 16 times 
higher than the effects of M&A activity. The difference in effect size drops to a multiple of 4 when 
applying a two standard deviation change. This is because the changes by two standard deviations in 
government spending (1.328) are stable and small due to strict budget planning compared to the ones 
observed in changes in more volatile market environments (28.371). Nevertheless, the comparison also 
reveals a smaller impact running from M&A activity in relation to the effects stemming from stock 
market capitalization and government spending developments. That does not come with surprise as 
scope and scale of stock markets is significantly larger than those of the M&A markets, and hence the 
impact on the income generation process is more comprehensive. Government spending is also 
supposed to affect more people than M&A activity does. Unsurprisingly, its effect size is larger. As it 
primarily benefits those at the bottom of the income distribution, the direct impact at the top of the 
distribution is of a negative nature. Nonetheless, despite being relatively small, the pro-rich impact of 
M&A activity remains economically non-negligible.  
The linearity assumption for the relationship between M&A activity and income inequality might 
be violated if higher changes in M&A activity have a disproportionately higher impact. To elaborate 
non-linearity, the squared term of the relative M&A activity measure is included in the baseline equation. 
Numerous clear and interesting results are shown in Table 5. 
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Table 5 FE OLS Model with Driscoll and Kraay standard errors and squared relative M&A activity term 
Regression #   (1)   (2)   (3)   (4)   (5)   (6)   (7)   (8) 
Dependent Variable  Δ Top 0.1% 
Income 
Share 
Δ Top 1% 
Income 
Share 
Δ Next 9% 
Income 
Share 
Δ Top 10% 
Income 
Share 
Δ Ratio Top 
1% to Next 
9% 









Key Independent Variable          
Δ rel. M&A Activity 0.00102* 0.00194* 0.00018 0.00216* 0.00955* 0.00337* 0.00026** 0.00016 
(0.00060) (0.00100) (0.00049) (0.00117) (0.00527) (0.00177) (0.00010) (0.00012) 
Δ rel. M&A Activity 
(squared) 
0.00020* 0.00041** 0.00013** 0.00053*** 0.00153** 0.00077** 0.00025*** 0.00013*** 
(0.00010) (0.00015) (0.00006) (0.00019) (0.00067) (0.00031) (0.00004) (0.00005) 
Control Variables          
Δ Stock Market 
Capitalization 
0.00849** 0.01319** -0.00006 0.01295** 0.06029** 0.02413** 0.00151*** 0.00110* 
(0.00416) (0.00584) (0.00144) (0.00532) (0.02848) (0.01149) (0.00046) (0.00065) 
Δ log real GDP per 
capita 
0.02524*** 0.03063** -0.02063 0.00972 0.15560*** 0.04872 -0.01220** -0.01494*** 
(0.00639) (0.01412) (0.01823) (0.03082) (0.03855) (0.03858) (0.00504) (0.00455) 
Δ Government 
Spending 
-0.10116*** -0.17280*** 0.01101 -0.18839*** -0.87743*** -0.37582*** -0.00661 0.00156 
(0.02851) (0.03513) (0.03975) (0.04052) (0.20505) (0.06552) (0.00699) (0.00776) 
Δ Unemployment Rate 0.00441 0.00073 -0.00156 0.00051 -0.00420 -0.00331 0.02572*** 0.04205*** 
(0.01006) (0.01741) (0.01909) (0.03206) (0.05746) (0.04232) (0.00831) (0.01427) 
Δ Trade Volume 0.00107 0.00503 0.00163 0.00621 0.00822 0.01164 -0.00146 -0.00026 
(0.00329) (0.00486) (0.00626) (0.00947) (0.01940) (0.01180) (0.00105) (0.00083) 
Δ Age Dependency 
Ratio 
-0.00445 -0.01936 -0.09093 -0.11474 0.13293 -0.06813 -0.04080 -0.01517 
(0.04445) (0.07608) (0.05752) (0.09606) (0.33385) (0.15849) (0.03047) (0.04074) 
Constant -0.00359*** -0.00589*** 0.00245*** 0.00321** 0.00063 -0.01199*** 0.00324*** 0.00038 
(0.00076) (0.00132) (0.00068) (0.00120) (0.00461) (0.00277) (0.00064) (0.00080) 
Observations 1159 1159 1147 1147 1147 1142 1215 1215 
R-squared (within) 0.08554 0.10720 0.03925 0.09232 0.11293 0.08219 0.12599 0.19648 
Country fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Time fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Notes: Driscoll and Kraay standard errors are in parentheses *** p<.01, ** p<.05, * p<.1   
To begin with, the results mainly mirror the results obtained in Table 1 and allow similar statistical 
inference of a positive association between relative M&A activity across the set of different income 
inequality measures. Second, the inclusion of the squared term of the M&A measure appears to be 
meaningful with statistical relevance at the 1% and 5% significance levels.30 Given the consistent 
positive sign of the squared term, it can be inferred that in periods of greater changes in relative M&A 
activity the impact on top income shares, top income share ratios and the Gini coefficients is higher, 
too.31 For the top 1% income share, this non-linear relationship unfolds through an increasing effects 
size, where an increase in M&A activity by one percentage point correlates to a higher income share 
level by 0.00194 percentage points, while a ten-percentage point increase would leverage the average 
marginal effect up to 0.00202. For the United States that have a top 1% income share mean value of 
15.41%, a ten-percentage point increase in M&A activity relates to a growth in the top 1% income share 
by 0.1312%. By ignoring the non-linearities and using the corresponding estimate from the baseline 
model, the top 1% income share would grow by 0.1311%. Although the slope of this non-linearity is 
all but steep, strong statistical evidence substantiates the inclusion of the squared term of the M&A 
measure.  
5.1.2    Are Anglo-Saxon Countries Different? 
As outlined in hypothesis three, it is conceivable that effects of M&A activity and other control 
variables on top income shares in Anglo Saxon countries systematically differ from those in other 
countries. Therefore, the model adds an interaction term to its specification. The dummy variable is 
equal to zero for Anglo-Saxon countries and equals one for all non-Anglo-Saxon countries. Table 6 
shows the regression results with the specified interaction term.  
When top income shares and top income share ratios are defined as dependent variable, results do 
not suggest any systematic distributional effects from M&A activity which statistically differs with 
significance between the two country-groups. This leads to the rejection of hypothesis three. However, 
the interaction terms between changes in M&A activity and changes in both Gini coefficients indicate 
with statistical significance at the 5% level that effects of M&A are more strongly related to ascending 
income inequality in Anglo-Saxon countries. Given the sign and magnitude of the interaction term, 
effects of M&A activity in the other country-group are close to zero but remain slightly positive without 
 
30 An exception is the 10% significance level when regressed on top 0.1% income share.  
31 Surprisingly, M&A activity has a significantly positive impact on the Gini Coefficient after income 
redistribution that is larger than the Gini Coefficient based on market income.  
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statistical significance. Across all regressions that estimate the effects on top income shares and ratios, 
such a diverging pattern between both country-groups is observable as well, even though it lacks 
statistical significance. Aside from this, the effect on income inequality related to M&A activity is 
surprisingly stronger after the redistribution of income, putting into question the effectiveness and 
efficiency of redistributive powers in Anglo-Saxon countries.32 
Table 6 FE OLS Model with Driscoll and Kraay standard errors and interaction term for Anglo-Saxon countries 
Regression #   (1)   (2)   (3)   (4)   (5)   (6)   (7)   (8) 
Dependent Variable  Δ Top 0.1% 
Income 
Share 
Δ Top 1% 
Income 
Share 
Δ Next 9% 
Income 
Share 
Δ Top 10% 
Income 
Share 
Δ Ratio Top 
1% to Next 
9% 









Key Independent Variable          
Δ rel. M&A Activity  0.00458 0.01528 0.00917 0.02456 0.04044 0.03726 0.00985** 0.00913** 
(0.01098) (0.01585) (0.00717) (0.01820) (0.07110) (0.02897) (0.00391) (0.00349) 
Δ rel. M&A Activity * 
Non-Anglo-Saxon 
(1=non- Anglo Saxon) 
-0.00356 -0.01342 -0.00907 -0.02256 -0.03096 -0.03413 -0.00965** -0.00904** 
(0.01088) (0.01571) (0.00745) (0.01838) (0.07017) (0.02865) (0.00392) (0.00349) 
Control Variables          
Δ Stock Market 
Capitalization 
0.00844** 0.01304** -0.00013 0.01273** 0.05989** 0.02380** 0.00142*** 0.00103 
(0.00415) (0.00581) (0.00147) (0.00528) (0.02840) (0.01141) (0.00046) (0.00064) 
Δ log real GDP per 
capita 
0.02526*** 0.03068** -0.02060 0.00981 0.15578*** 0.04886 -0.01214** -0.01490*** 
(0.00640) (0.01421) (0.01833) (0.03106) (0.03851) (0.03886) (0.00513) (0.00466) 
Δ Government 
Spending 
-0.10143*** -0.17312*** 0.01114 -0.18850*** -0.87935*** -0.37594*** -0.00671 0.00163 
(0.02888) (0.03572) (0.03955) (0.04060) (0.20724) (0.06637) (0.00710) (0.00767) 
Δ Unemployment Rate 0.00477 0.00189 -0.00090 0.00227 -0.00137 -0.00066 0.02652*** 0.04274*** 
(0.00963) (0.01723) (0.01926) (0.03230) (0.05595) (0.04206) (0.00844) (0.01440) 
Δ Trade Volume 0.00105 0.00505 0.00169 0.00630 0.00807 0.01180 -0.00143 -0.00020 
(0.00329) (0.00492) (0.00632) (0.00958) (0.01953) (0.01194) (0.00106) (0.00087) 
Δ Age Dependency 
Ratio 
-0.00811 -0.02748 -0.09410 -0.12600 0.10417 -0.08478 -0.04569 -0.01815 
(0.04362) (0.07454) (0.05797) (0.09526) (0.32724) (0.15546) (0.03238) (0.04142) 
Constant -0.00362*** -0.00597*** 0.00217** 0.00250* -0.00041 -0.01218*** 0.00319*** 0.00033 
(0.00076) (0.00131) (0.00081) (0.00137) (0.00523) (0.00270) (0.00065) (0.00083) 
Observations 1159 1159 1147 1147 1147 1142 1215 1215 
R-squared (within) 0.08541 0.10724 0.03974 0.09282 0.11276 0.08251 0.12697 0.19826 
Country fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Time fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Notes: Driscoll and Kraay standard errors are in parentheses *** p<.01, ** p<.05, * p<.1   
 
5.1.3    Are Systematic Banking Crises Pro-rich? 
According to hypothesis four, the magnitude of the effects of M&A activity on top income shares 
in years of regular economic development might systematically vary from those in years of systematic 
banking crises. To account for such differences, an interaction in form of a dummy variable is added to 
the baseline equation where the value of one signifies the presence of a systematic banking crisis. The 
results obtained and presented in table 7 support the validity of hypothesis four.  
Most apparently, the interaction is significant and positive across five out of six inequality 
measures that capture effects at the very top of the income distribution. The only exception is the group 
of the next 9% of income earners.33 Thus, the regression results reveal that M&A activity has a stronger 
and pro-rich impact on top income shares during periods of systematic banking crises. For example, the 
specific estimate related to the top 1% income share imply that an increase in M&A activity by one 
percentage point is associated with a respectable surge of 0.056 percentage points. This magnitude is 
about 28 times the effect size observed in times of regular economic development. Again, considering 
the mean annual changes of M&A activity of 2.9 percentage point, the impact of the transaction M&A 
channel on the top 1% income share skyrockets up to 1.318%. A change by two standard deviations 
leads to a 12.897% increase. As theorized earlier, M&A transactions are still closed in times of 
collapsing banking systems and attractively realise acquisitions at lower prices in sense of “buying the 
dip”. Whereas others might struggle to generate capital or labour income, working in the M&A sector 
seems to generate relatively stable and lucrative income. These findings strongly indicate the high 
relevance of M&A activity in the income generating process of the richer classes during years of 
 
32 To be fair, the effect after redistribution is also stronger in the more heterogenous country group of non-
Anglo-Saxon countries. Though, there is no statistical significance, and the estimate is close to zero.  
33 Despite the lack of statistical significance, the sign of this estimates is negative and thus opposite to the 
estimates of all other inequality measures.    
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systematic banking crises. Finally, empirical findings related to other control variable resemble those 
obtained when the baseline equation is applied.  
Table 7 FE OLS Model with Driscoll and Kraay standard errors and interaction term for systematic banking crises 
Regression #   (1)   (2)   (3)   (4)   (5)   (6)   (7)   (8) 
Dependent Variable  Δ Top 0.1% 
Income 
Share 
Δ Top 1% 
Income 
Share 
Δ Next 9% 
Income 
Share 
Δ Top 10% 
Income 
Share 
Δ Ratio Top 
1% to Next 
9% 









Key Independent Variable          
Δ rel. M&A Activity  0.00052 0.00120* 0.00019 0.00144 0.00598** 0.00223 0.00032 0.00027 
(0.00041) (0.00067) (0.00053) (0.00105) (0.00254) (0.00142) (0.00030) (0.00018) 
Δ rel. M&A Activity * 
Sys. Banking Crises 
(1=Sys. Banking Crises) 
0.03849*** 0.05596*** -0.00457 0.05182*** 0.28291*** 0.08919*** 0.00012 -0.00111 
(0.01133) (0.01420) (0.00420) (0.01255) (0.08375) (0.02538) (0.00318) (0.00347) 
Control Variables          
Δ Stock Market 
Capitalization 
0.00724** 0.01122** -0.00032 0.01081** 0.05152** 0.02098** 0.00155*** 0.00145*** 
(0.00348) (0.00485) (0.00163) (0.00415) (0.02330) (0.00995) (0.00045) (0.00049) 
Δ log real GDP per 
capita 
0.02755*** 0.03226** -0.02613 0.00712 0.17849*** 0.05152 -0.01127* -0.01105** 
(0.00588) (0.01273) (0.01856) (0.02925) (0.03983) (0.03586) (0.00607) (0.00505) 
Δ Government 
Spending 
-0.09666*** -0.16913*** 0.00358 -0.19185*** -0.84577*** -0.37219*** -0.00597 0.00567 
(0.03033) (0.03661) (0.04223) (0.04140) (0.22131) (0.06828) (0.00714) (0.00754) 
Δ Unemployment Rate -0.00015 -0.00468 0.00226 -0.00215 -0.04206 -0.01244 0.02539*** 0.04022*** 
(0.01027) (0.01871) (0.01825) (0.03293) (0.06436) (0.04474) (0.00819) (0.01407) 
Δ Trade Volume 0.00082 0.00484 0.00233 0.00653 0.00530 0.01125 -0.00167 -0.00089 
(0.00332) (0.00492) (0.00597) (0.00926) (0.01951) (0.01187) (0.00103) (0.00087) 
Δ Age Dependency 
Ratio 
-0.01900 -0.04266 -0.09378 -0.14116 0.02572 -0.10779 -0.04461 -0.01634 
(0.04468) (0.07731) (0.05876) (0.09819) (0.33478) (0.16080) (0.03198) (0.04257) 
Constant -0.00346*** -0.00577*** 0.00233*** 0.00291** -0.00003 -0.01180*** 0.00325*** 0.00049 
(0.00075) (0.00132) (0.00084) (0.00133) (0.00461) (0.00278) (0.00068) (0.00075) 
Observations 1159 1159 1147 1147 1147 1142 1215 1215 
R-squared (within) 0.09441 0.11614 0.04712 0.09975 0.12562 0.08689 0.12498 0.21085 
Country fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Time fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Notes: Driscoll and Kraay standard errors are in parentheses *** p<.01, ** p<.05, * p<.1   
5.2 Robustness Analyses  
5.2.1    Specification of M&A Data 
First, the results may be sensitive on how M&A data is specified. The measure of relative M&A 
activity puts the annual aggregated transaction values in relation to a country’s GDP. The presence of 
cross-border deals, however, could be a potential source of distortion. In theory, a small country could 
show significantly and constantly high levels of M&A activity in relation to its actual small GDP due 
to inbound M&A from company’s located in other countries. Similarly, countries with large economies 
might have lower levels of relative M&A activity due to a greater number of acquisitions abroad. To 
control for such, it is useful to abstract from the presence of cross-border transactions for a moment, 
and only incorporate purely domestic M&A deals when calculating the annual aggregated transaction 
values that are than put into relation with the respective country’s GDP. Inferences regarding the 
domestically specified relative M&A activity do not lead to fundamental changes, allowing further 
confidence in the integrity of the main estimation results. Table A.8. summarizes the regression results 
when applying the measure of domestic M&A activity. In fact, the results robustly report positive 
associations across all income inequality measures, including the Gini coefficients and the income share 
of the next 9%. The magnitude of the estimates is of similar size but slightly larger in each of the 
regression specifications when compared to the corresponding model that includes domestic and cross-
border M&A transactions.  
5.2.2    Alternative and Additional Controls 
Alternative Controls. Another set of robustness tests replaces preferred control variables by 
plausible alternatives. First, the existence of two equally reasonable proxies of financial development 
demands substitution, with private credit as a measure of bank-based financial development replacing 
stock market capitalization. To account for bank-based and market-oriented financing, a combination 
of both is used to capture potential effects coming from total financial development. Second, the de 
facto trade openness measure aimed to proxy globalization is replaced by the KOF trade globalization 
index that encompasses de facto and de jure developments. As shown in table A.9., none of the 
alterations performed exhibits substantially different effects of M&A activity across the set of 
independent income inequality variables. By focusing on the effect on top income shares and pertinent 
dispersion ratios, all alternative measures in the panels A (Private Credit), B (Total Financial 
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Development), and C (KOF Index) turn out to be statistically insignificant. This gives evidence for the 
minor role of bank-based and higher relevance of market-oriented financial development as an impact 
factor on top income shares and ratios. Hence, model specifications that include the stock market 
capitalization provide regression results and estimates more properly suited for valid statistical 
inference. The index-based globalization measure does not prove to be statistically significant either. In 
summary, the results presented in this subsection are perceived as affirmative in favour of the main 
results.  
Additional Controls. Economic theory suggests other theoretical channels to influence top income 
shares such as tax progressivity, government ideology, technological change. Results may be sensitive 
to the inclusion of additional control variables. To start with, the top statutory income tax rate controls 
for changes in tax progressivity for a far smaller panel data sample. The results presented in table A.10. 
are supportive for the assumption that rising tax progressivity through increased taxation of top earners 
effectively lowers top 0.1% and 1% income shares. Quantitatively, a one-percentage-point change in 
the top statutory income tax rate is associated with a remarkable decrease of the top 1% income share 
by almost 0.4 percentage points. The non-linear positive impact of M&A activity on top income shares 
and ratios remains statistically significant, but with smaller effect sizes across all income inequality 
measures. Next, the government ideology of the leading party might influence tax policy. To account 
for that, the tax progressivity variable is interacted with a categorical variable that defines three different 
governmental ideologies. Except for the income share group of the next 9%, all interactions are mostly 
statistically relevant at the 1% level across the other top income shares and ratios. In times of left-
oriented political leadership, an increasing tax progressivity effectively lowered the share of top income 
earners. In contrast to this, changes towards higher taxation of top incomes under the leadership of a 
government with centre- or right-oriented ideology even facilitated the rise of top income shares.34 The 
variables of M&A activity possess the same results as before, confirming their robustness.  
To control for annual changes in technological progress, proxy variables such as the agriculture 
share or the patent applications are added to the model specification. When proxied by the former, 
technological change has a statistically significant and negative association with both top 0.1% and 10% 
income shares, and the top-1%-to-next-9% income share ratio. The estimates of patent applications as 
a proxy for technological progress, however, lack statistical significance across the entire set of 
dependent variables. Again, estimates of M&A activity remain mostly unaffected in their algebraic sign, 
effect size and statistical significance. Overall, inferences regarding M&A activity are shown to be 
robust to changes in tax progressivity, government ideology, and technology.  
 
Section 6 | Conclusion 
Only recently, economic literature has theorized transactional effects of M&A activity to influence 
the income generation process of the working rich by offering lucrative income opportunities to deal-
facilitating intermediaries residing at the top of the income distribution. This study empirically 
investigated the impact of M&A activity on top income shares, assuming a positive correlation. Results 
confirm this hypothesis’ validity and document a positive and statistically significant association 
between changes in M&A activity and changes in top income shares at different specification levels. 
More specifically, empirical evidence supports a positive non-linear relation, suggesting that larger 
changes in M&A activity relate to slightly greater changes in top income shares. It is found that the 
effect’s magnitude rises with higher ranks of the income share. A complementing analysis on top 
income share ratios suggest a pro-rich impact stemming from M&A activity at the cost of income groups 
 
34  A deeper investigation on potential mechanisms behind these differential effect in dependence of 





ranked below the top 1% income share threshold. The results are robust to an adjusted specification of 
domestic M&A activity. Across model specifications, the effects on top income shares running from 
control variables like economic growth or financialization are in line with previous research results 
obtained from Roine et al. (2009) or Neal (2013).  
In addition to these findings, systematic banking crises seem to provide a window of opportunity 
in which dealmakers involved in M&A activity could benefit extraordinarily. Indeed, in times of 
systematic crises, which is when most income flow opportunities run dry such as dividend payments, 
the quantitative impact of M&A activity on top income shares becomes a multiple of its regular 
magnitude. Assumingly, this could be driven by relatively stable M&A activity in times of financial 
shocks which offer opportunities to buy companies at lower valuations with high upside or restructuring 
potential. However, despite of the increased impact during systematic banking crises, the quantitative 
effect of M&A activity on top income shares is relatively small compared to other statistically 
significant determinants.  
The lack of statistical significance on different systematic distributional effects between Anglo-
Saxon and other countries, leads to rejection of the hypothesis that the effect of M&A activity on top 
income shares could be more pronounced in Anglo-Saxon countries. Nevertheless, by relaxing the 
formulation of the hypothesis to allow testing for differences using a more general measure of income 
inequality, M&A activity gives insight into the different experiences that Anglo-Saxon countries had 
compared to other countries. So, when regressing on the Gini coefficient, the effects of M&A activity 
are systematically and significantly different and more pronounced in Anglo-Saxon countries. 
Admittedly, the theoretical channel of transactional M&A effects does not play out at the very top so 
that other theoretical channels such as post-acquisition restructuring measures in more neoliberal 
economies might explain these country-group differences. Future research is necessary to unravel the 
mechanism behind this finding.  
Finally, some limitations to my analysis should be borne in mind. First, in most economies, only 
those deal values of completed transactions involving a listed company need to be published. Private 
deals do not have to report corresponding deal values. Owing to that type of data constraint, the M&A 
activity measure is most probably undervalued and prone to attenuation bias even by relying on one of 
the world’s most reliable and comprehensive M&A databases. Second, while the estimation method 
primarily addresses issues of cross-sectional dependence and endogeneity stemming from omitted-
variable bias, this approach does not solve potential endogeneity rooted in reverse causality. As such, 
the results should be interpreted as associations rather than effects that indicate causality, even though 
results from control variables are in line with findings from other studies that attempted to establish 
causality (see Roine et al., 2009, Neal, 2013).  
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Appendix A.I. – Inequality in the United States (1980-2019)  
Using the United States as an example, the development of all income inequality measures used in 
this research approach are displayed in the following figures (A.1. to A.4.). Compared to all other 
measures that show significant increases since the 1980’s, the measure of the next 9% has remained 
relatively stable around the 25% level. This might be a first indication that recent rises in income 
inequality at the very top of the distribution could be driven by income earning opportunities for the 
rich elites. 
Figure A.1. Top Income Shares (0.1% and 1%)  Figure A.2. Next 9% and Top 10% Income Share  
           
 
Figure A.3. Income Share Ratios Figure A.4. Gini Coefficients  
           
This hypothesis finds additional support through increases in the income share ratios. Whereas the 
ratio between the richest one percent and the next 9% of income earners (ratio I) was around 0.4 in 
1980, the current level is close to hit the 0.7 threshold. A similar pattern is observable for the ratio 
between the richest one percent and the bottom 90% of income earners (ratio II). Finally, the Gini 
coefficients also indicate increasing levels of income inequality. 
Appendix A.II. – Testing for Heteroskedasticity and Cross-sectional Dependence  
Heteroskedasticity. By using a modified Wald test for groupwise heteroskedasticity, this 
subsection focuses on testing the restrictive assumption of homoskedasticity which presumes the same 
variance across time and cross-sections in the error structure. The error structure suffers from groupwise 
heteroskedasticity if the error term differs across units (cross-sections). Technically, the xttest3 Stata 
command is applied according to which the resulting test statistic is distributed chi-squared under the 
null hypothesis of homoskedasticity. As presented in table A.1, the results show strong evidence of 




Table A.1. Modified Wald test for groupwise heteroskedasticity in fixed-effect regression models 
Regression #   (1)   (2)   (3)   (4)   (5)   (6)   (7)   (8) 
Dependent Variable  Δ Top 0.1% 
Income 
Share 
Δ Top 1% 
Income 
Share 
Δ Next 9% 
Income 
Share 
Δ Top 10% 
Income 
Share 
Δ Ratio Top 
1% to Next 
9% 









         
Chi-squared 23373.54 6422.20 9820.78 4397.31 9696.75 18465.26 5182.94 7908.83 
Prob>chi-squared 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 00.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
# Countries 46 46 46 46 46 46 46 46 
Country fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Time fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Notes: The xtreg, fe Stata command uses the baseline regression specification with all control variables. Then, the xttest3 Stata command is applied. 
Cross-sectional Dependence. Panel data models (xtreg) are built on the assumption that the error 
terms are independent across cross-sectional units. This assumption of cross-sectional independence is 
rather restrictive due to the increasing economic and financial integration of countries that inherently 
imply interdependencies between cross-sections. Given the underlying panel structure where N > T, the 
Breusch-Pagan test is not valid (De Hoyos and Sarafidis, 2006). To test for the presence of cross-
sectional dependence in panels with many cross-sectional units and few time-series observations, the 
xtcsd Stata command is appropriate. The unbalanced panel structure requires to apply the pesaran 
option which follows a standard normal distribution of the pertinent statistic under the null hypothesis 
of cross-sectional independence. The abs option completes the testing results by providing the average 
absolute value of the off-diagonal elements of the cross-sectional correlation matrix of the error terms. 
According to De Hoyos and Sarafidis (2006), this specification is advantageous to identify cases of 
cross-sectional dependence where correlations can have changing signs. In addition, the xtcdf Stata 
command is used to test each variables panel structure separately. Its distribution is standard normal, 
and the null hypothesis is cross-sectional independence.  
Table A.2. Post-estimation test for cross-sectional dependence in fixed-effect panel data models  
Regression #   (1)   (2)   (3)   (4)   (5)   (6)   (7)   (8) 
Dependent Variable  Δ Top 0.1% 
Income 
Share 
Δ Top 1% 
Income 
Share 
Δ Next 9% 
Income 
Share 
Δ Top 10% 
Income 
Share 
Δ Ratio Top 
1% to Next 
9% 









         
Pesaran  -0.744 -1.837* -0.834 -2.207** -1.436 -0.707 -3.107*** -2.940*** 
 (0.4570) (0.0662) (0.4043) (0.0273) (0.1509) (0.4799) (0.0019) (0.0033) 
Average Absolute Value 0.196 0.193 0.213 0.196 0.199 0.197 0.250 0.258 
# Countries 46 46 46 46 46 46 46 46 
Country fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Time fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Notes: The xtreg, fe Stata command uses the baseline regression specification with all control variables. Then, the xtcsd Stata command is applied with pesaran and abs option 
*** p<.01, ** p<.05, * p<.1. 
As displayed in table A.2., the test proposed by Pesaran (2004) rejects the null hypothesis of no 
cross-sectional dependence at different significance levels in four out of eight regression specifications. 
However, the results presented with this test might fail to reject the null hypothesis even if there is 
substantial cross-sectional dependence due to adding up positive and negative correlations (De Hoyos 
and Sarafidis, 2006). This shortage applies in the underlying case since the paper analyses first-
differenced data. Hence, the underlying regression variables reflect changes that can be positive and 
negative. The average absolute correlation constantly ranges between 0.193 and 0.258 across all 
regression specifications, implying more than just moderate levels of cross-sectional dependence that 
are not neglectable anymore. To reassure this evidence, a closer look at each variable’s cross-sectional 
panel structure could be helpful to reject or confirm the violation against the assumption of cross-
sectional dependence. The following table A.3. presents the results when applying xtcdf. 
Table A.3. CD-test for cross-sectional dependence  
Variables 
(in levels) 
CD-Test p-value Variables 
(first differenced) 
CD-Test p-value 
Dependent Variables       
 0.1% Top Income Share 37.327*** 0.000  0.1% Top Income Share 8.109*** 0.000 
 1% Top Income Share 38.678*** 0.000  1% Top Income Share 9.237*** 0.000 
 Next 9% Top Income Shares 23.498*** 0.000  Next 9% Top Income Shares 1.860* 0.063 
 10% Top Income Shares 39.246*** 0.000  10% Top Income Shares 7.419*** 0.000 
 Ratio Top 1% to Next 9% 36.522*** 0.000  Ratio Top 1% to Next 9% 8.622*** 0.000 
 Ratio Top 1% to Bottom 90% 39.409*** 0.000  Ratio Top 1% to Bottom 90% 8.745*** 0.000 




 Gini coefficient (market) 40.160*** 0.000  Gini coefficient (market) 20.15*** 0.000 
      
Independent Variables      
 Relative M&A Activity 46.299*** 0.000  Relative M&A Activity 17.491*** 0.000 
 Stock Market Capitalization 67.773*** 0.000  Stock Market Capitalization 68.483*** 0.000 
 Real GDP per capita (log) 160.057*** 0.000  Real GDP per capita (log) 56.587*** 0.000 
 Government Spending 27.068*** 0.000  Government Spending 42.140*** 0.000 
 Trade Volume 91.597*** 0.000  Trade Volume 64.234*** 0.000 
 Unemployment Rate 11.813*** 0.000  Unemployment Rate 33.503*** 0.000 
 Age Dependency Ratio 41.947*** 0.000  Age Dependency Ratio 84.303*** 0.000 
      
Variables Robustness Check      
 Private Credit 69.091*** 0.000  Private Credit 23.724*** 0.000 
 Financial Development 77.939*** 0.000  Financial Development 51.884*** 0.000 
 KOF Trade Globalization Index 90.960*** 0.000  KOF Trade Globalization Index 29.575*** 0.000 
 Agriculture Share 117.639*** 0.000  Agriculture Share 21.907*** 0.000 
 Top Statutory Income Tax Rate 11.399*** 0.000  Top Statutory Income Tax Rate 5.052*** 0.000 
 Patent Applications (log) 16.571*** 0.000  Patent Applications (log) 3.126*** 0.002 
Notes: *** p<.01, ** p<.05, * p<.1.  
This general diagnostic test for cross-sectional dependence in panels is applied for all variables 
used in the analyses above. The test is used for variables in level and in first-differenced format. Except 
for the first differenced variable of the top income share of the next nine percent, all variables reject the 
null hypothesis of no cross-sectional dependence at the 1% significance level. This strongly indicates 
the presence of cross-sectional dependence across panels in each variable that is robust when analysing 
level or first-differenced data. Combined with the results obtained in table A.2., this leads to the 
conclusion that the assumption of no cross-sectional dependence is violated. Valid statistical inference 
requires adequate adjustment of standard errors.  
Appendix A.III. – Discussion on Selecting the Preferred Regression Estimation Method 
If only violations of the homoskedasticity and serial correlation assumptions were present, the 
prominent cluster-robust standard errors would appropriately and robustly estimate the covariance 
matrix. However, this estimation method cannot adjust the standard errors for cross-sectional 
dependence and would provide misleading inferential statistics (Hoechle, 2007), with the consequence 
of not being the preferred choice. Instead, for valid statistical inference, it is either necessary to execute 
appropriate standard error adjustments to OLS estimations or to apply another estimation method such 
as the GLS estimator to possibly improve model efficiency. Choosing between these options in a panel 
data structure with prevalence of the cross-sectional unit dimension N does not come without further 
complexity, as each of the proposed estimation methods relies on large-T asymptotics (see Parks, 1967, 
Beck and Katz, 1995, Driscoll and Kraay, 1998, Hoechle, 2007).  
To construct standard errors robust to cross-sectional dependence, the GLS estimation method 
needs to estimate all pairwise covariances between the cross-sectional units and thereby relies on an N 
x N cross-sectional covariance matrix (Beck and Katz, 1995). As the maximum rank of the N x N cross-
sectional covariance matrix is determined by the lesser value of T and N, it becomes invertible when N 
is larger than T (Beck and Katz, 1995).35 This mathematical constraint alone makes the GLS estimator 
technically infeasible for a qualified application in this research’s panel data structure with N > T. 
Furthermore, through analysis of finite sample performances, (Beck and Katz, 1995) argue that the GLS 
estimator produces inaccurate and overly optimistic standard errors which more generally calls into 
question the precision of results obtained from the GLS estimation method when N is small. Therefore, 
they developed an estimation method that still relies on the OLS coefficient estimates but substitutes 
the corresponding OLS standard errors with panel-corrected standard errors (PCSE) that by default 
 
35 By constructing and analysing finite sample performances, Beck and Katz (1995) point out that even when 
T is larger than N, and both are of comparable size, the estimation of the pairwise cross-sectional covariances will 





account for cross-sectional dependence.36 In brevity, the PCSE method estimates the full N x N cross-
sectional covariance matrix but makes the strong assumption that all cross-sectional correlations are 
identical for every pair of cross-sectional units (Hoechle, 2007). Methodologically, such a constrained 
cross-sectional correlation matrix is all but immune against misspecification (Hoechle, 2007). With 
regards to applicability, the PCSE estimator seems to be popular in small samples sizes where the time 
dimension T is prevalent (Millo, 2017). Indeed, one should be cautious to use the PCSE estimator in a 
short panel data structure as the finite sample properties are poor when the ratio between T/N is rather 
small (Hoechle, 2007).  
As the GLS estimator and the PCSE correction are inappropriate to correct for heteroskedasticity as 
well as temporal and cross-sectional dependence when the cross-sectional unit dimension N grows large, 
Driscoll and Kraay (1998) developed a nonparametric standard error correction method that remedies 
the deficiencies of these large-T estimators. First, they define aggregated moment conditions by 
averaging over the cross-sectional units N in each period, so that the cross-sectional dimension collapses 
into a single time-series. Then, they apply the standard nonparametric Newey-West estimator to the 
obtained sequence of cross-sectional averages of the moment conditions. This transformation 
guarantees consistency of the Driscoll-Kraay covariance matrix estimator, independently of the cross-
sectional unit dimension N that is also allowed to grow at any rate relative to T (N → ∞). In this context, 
Driscoll and Kraay (1998) demonstrate that their estimation produces standard errors consistent to 
general forms of cross-sectional and temporal dependence, releasing researchers from parametrically 
specifying the exact correlation structures of the standard errors without prior knowledge about them. 
This is a clear advantage over the PCSE estimator because the lack of a natural order of cross-sectional 
dependence makes it difficult to determine a specific form. In conformity with the theoretical 
asymptotic properties of the Driscoll-Kraay estimator, caution is advised in panel data structures 
classified as being small in terms of their time dimension T (Hoechle, 2007). However, even in finite 
sample performances with small time dimensions such as T=10, the Driscoll and Kraay estimator shows 
respectable accuracy compared to alternatives not taking into account adjustments for cross-sectional 
dependence (Driscoll and Kraay, 1998).37 This resonates with the findings of Hoechle (2007) who 
reports dominance of the Driscoll and Kraay estimator over methods that do not correct standard errors 
for cross-sectional correlation when the panel data structure exhibits a balanced nature and the time 
dimension T is rather short with values of T equal to 10, 15 and 25 periods, respectively.  
Table A.4. Summary of selected estimation methods that produces robust standard errors 
Sources: Original version is taken from Hoechle (2007) and extended by further categories such as asymptotic properties. 
Carefully considering theoretical asymptotics and finite sample performances of each estimator 
discussed above and comparing them to the properties of the underlying unbalanced and short panel 
 
36 When the assumptions imposed to the OLS standard errors are not met, coefficient estimates obtained 
from OLS are still consistent but inefficient. Therefore, relying on OLS estimates but just correcting their standard 
errors is a plausible strategy. 
37 This study relies on a panel data structure whose time dimension T ranges between T=13 (Romania) to 
T=39 (United States). The length of the time dimension of the majority of countries included is T > 20. 
Estimation 
Method 










FGLS Yes Yes Yes No Large T-Asymptotics 
No, N < T required for 
feasibility 
PCSE Yes Yes Yes No Large T-Asymptotics 
Yes, if the ratio T/N is 
small 
Driscoll-
Kraay Yes Yes Yes No 
Large T-
Asymptotics 
Yes, independent of N. 
More precise when T → ∞ 




data structure, reasonably advocates applying the OLS estimation method adjusted by the covariance 
matrix consistent Driscoll and Kraay standard error corrections. Table A.4. provides a short summary. 
For a complete mathematical treatment see Beck and Katz (1995), Driscoll and Kraay (1998), and 
Hoechle (2007).  
Appendix A.IV. – Testing for Stationarity  
Due to the restrictive formulation of the null hypothesis of panel unit root testing methodologies, 
the rejection in favour of the alternative hypothesis does not mean that all the panels are stationary as it 
is assumed in basic econometric models applied in panel data context. Instead, the rejection only 
validates that at least one panel is stationary without providing information which panels are stationary 
and which ones are non-stationary. Only the Hadri LM test assumes that all panels are stationary against 
the alternative hypothesis that at least one panel contains a unit root and is therefore non-stationary. 
However, this test is not applicable for unbalanced panel data sets. Given the shortages of panel unit 
root testing methodologies, this paper separately investigates each panel at the country-level in order to 
confirm or reject the violation of the assumption that all panels should be stationary.  
The Augmented Dickey-Fuller and Phillips-Perron unit root test are performed, using the dfuller 
and pperron Stata commands respectively. Both define a null hypothesis that assumes the variable to 
contain a unit root, whereas the alternative hypothesis states that the variable follows a stationary 
process. The tests are only performed for the dependent variable and the key independent variable of 
M&A activity. The variables of interest are first tested in levels, followed by complementary tests of 
each variables first-differenced format. Results are reported in table A.6. and table A.7. 
To begin with, table A.6. analyses the top 1% income share variable. When measured in levels, the 
majority of panels fails to reject the null hypothesis, and only a few panels show significance at the 1% 
and 5% significance level. Hence, the top 1% income share variable follows a non-stationary process. 
Using this variable would produce spurious regression results invalid for correct statistical inference. 
In such cases, it is often argued that a transformation into first-differenced data helps to widely eradicate 
this bias. Indeed, when measured in first-differenced format, the problem of non-stationary does not 
entirely vanish but greatly mitigates the risk of spurious regressions results. The majority of panels can 
reject the null hypothesis at the highest significance level and only three panels remain classified as 
non-stationary. This result is consistent for both tests applied. 
Table A.6. CD-test for cross-sectional dependence (ADF and PP specification) 












p-value PP Test 
Statistic 
p-value 
 Level Data First-Differenced Data 
Country            
 Argentina 22 -3.491** 0.0404 -3.520** 0.0373 21 -8.392*** 0.0000 -8.751*** 0.0000 
 Australia 35 -3.587** 0.0310 -3.487** 0.0408 34 -5.922*** 0.0000 -6.202*** 0.0000 
 Austria 34 -3.732** 0.0203 -3.795** 0.0168 33 -8.835*** 0.0000 -10.197*** 0.0000 
 Belgium 33 -3.804** 0.0163 -3.829** 0.0152 32 -5.167*** 0.0001 -5.294*** 0.0001 
 Brazil 18 -2.341 0.4114 -2.417 0.3709 17 -4.116*** 0.0060 -4.124*** 0.0058 
 Bulgaria 26 -1.191 0.9124 -1.445 0.8472 25 -4.918*** 0.0003 -5.028*** 0.0002 
 Canada 37 -2.469 0.3438 -2.440 0.3585 36 -6.444*** 0.0000 -6.670*** 0.0000 
 Chile 19 -2.537 0.3095 -2.658 0.2539 18 -2.317 0.4248 -2.217 0.4804 
 China 32 -0.222 0.9911 -0.927 0.9532 31 -3.270* 0.0714 -3.285* 0.0687 
 Colombia 26 -2.363 0.3996 -2.406 0.3762 25 -6.445*** 0.0000 -6.422*** 0.0000 
 Czech Republic 28 -2.696 0.2376 -2.562 0.2975 27 -6.735*** 0.0000 -7.494*** 0.0000 
 Denmark 33 -2.633 0.2649 -2.785 0.2026 32 -6.072*** 0.0000 -6.110*** 0.0000 
 Estonia 26 -2.549 0.3040 -2.607 0.2768 25 -5.350*** 0.0000 -5.366*** 0.0000 
 Finland 34 -1.227 0.9048 -1.517 0.8233 33 -4.776*** 0.0005 -4.837*** 0.0004 
 France 35 -1.933 0.6377 -1.815 0.6974 34 -6.202*** 0.0000 -6.372*** 0.0000 
 Germany 34 -1.639 0.7769 -2.155 0.5154 33 -3.313* 0.0642 -3.363* 0.0565 
 Greece 34 -1.533 0.8177 -1.953 0.6270 33 -3.816** 0.0158 -3.729** 0.0205 
 Hungary 30 -2.102 0.5449 -2.021 0.5902 29 -5.734*** 0.0000 -5.986*** 0.0000 
 Iceland 23 -2.539 0.3089 -2.584 0.2872 22 -5.124*** 0.0001 -5.146*** 0.0001 
 India 32 -0.469 0.9846 -0.721 0.9717 31 -5.042*** 0.0002 -5.084*** 0.0001 
 Ireland 33 -1.582 0.7996 -1.846 0.6823 32 -4.330*** 0.0028 -4.301*** 0.0031 
 Italy 34 -2.475 0.3406 -2.506 0.3250 33 -5.684*** 0.0000 -5.707*** 0.0000 
 Japan 34 -2.423 0.3674 -2.699 0.2367 33 -4.285*** 0.0033 -4.188*** 0.0047 




 Lithuania 24 -4.006*** 0.0086 -3.971*** 0.0097 23 -6.125*** 0.0000 -6.395*** 0.0000 
 Luxembourg 33 -3.967*** 0.0098 -4.025*** 0.0081 32 -8.827*** 0.0000 -11.717*** 0.0000 
 Malaysia 17 -1.343 0.8769 -1.798 0.7056 16 -2.272 0.4494 -2.317 0.4244 
 Netherlands 35 -2.707 0.2330 -2.698 0.2371 34 -7.278*** 0.0000 -7.413*** 0.0000 
 New Zealand 32 -3.236* 0.0775 -3.144* 0.0960 31 -6.318*** 0.0000 -6.647*** 0.0000 
 Nigeria 22 -0.207 0.9914 -0.479 0.9842 21 -1.487 0.8335 -1.645 0.7742 
 Norway 33 -1.380 0.8666 -1.121 0.9254 32 -7.145*** 0.0000 -7.703*** 0.0000 
 Poland 30 -2.435 0.3613 -2.451 0.3529 29 -5.325*** 0.0001 -5.331*** 0.0000 
 Portugal 32 -3.059 0.1163 -3.046 0.1197 31 -8.872*** 0.0000 -8.935*** 0.0000 
 Romania 26 -1.482 0.8351 -1.423 0.8540 25 -4.884*** 0.0003 -4.918*** 0.0003 
 Russia 27 -1.655 0.7700 -1.694 0.7535 26 -3.630** 0.0274 -3.645** 0.0263 
 Singapore 32 -1.748 0.7291 -2.028 0.5861 31 -5.551*** 0.0000 -5.581*** 0.0000 
 Slovenia 35 -2.470 0.3433 -2.499 0.3284 34 -4.603*** 0.0010 -4.596*** 0.0010 
 South Africa 29 -0.293 0.9897 -0.425 0.9861 28 -3.647** 0.0261 -3.512** 0.0382 
 South Korea 29 -2.152 0.5170 -2.211 0.4838 28 -5.885*** 0.0000 -5.887*** 0.0000 
 Spain 34 -1.019 0.9414 -1.072 0.9336 33 -5.336*** 0.0000 -5.373*** 0.0000 
 Sweden 34 -2.227 0.4744 -2.390 0.3847 33 -5.060*** 0.0002 -5.019*** 0.0002 
 Switzerland 35 -2.627 0.2678 -2.646 0.2590 34 -4.603*** 0.0010 -4.463*** 0.0017 
 Thailand 18 -3.269* 0.0714 -3.313* 0.0641 17 -7.527*** 0.0000 -7.044*** 0.0000 
 Turkey 29 -0.762 0.9688 -1.181 0.9144 28 -3.973*** 0.0096 -3.986*** 0.0092 
 United Kingdom 38 -1.502 0.8284 -1.700 0.7509 37 -6.818*** 0.0000 -6.772*** 0.0000 
 United States 41 -2.603 0.2785 -2.561 0.2982 40 -6.399*** 0.0000 -6.560*** 0.0000 
 Notes: MacKinnon approximate p-value for Z(t). Trend option is applied to include a constant and time trend. *** p<.01, ** p<.05, * p<.1. 
As can be seen in table A.7., the variable of relative M&A activity is also exposed to the risk of 
producing spurious regression results when used in econometric models that rely on exploiting its data 
in levels. The Augmented Dickey-Fuller test and the Phillips-Perron test, both confirm the presence of 
non-stationary processes in several panels. Again, the transformation into first-differenced data seems 
to drastically alleviate this risk as all but one panel significantly demonstrate the absence of non-
stationary processes. Consequently, this paper follows the strategy to mitigate spurious regression 
results by applying variables transformed into first-differenced format.  













p-value PP Test 
Statistic 
p-value 
 Level Data First-Differenced Data 
Country            
 Argentina 30 -4.450*** 0.0018 -4.490*** 0.0016 29 -7.648*** 0.0000 -7.977*** 0.0000 
 Australia 35 -2.641 0.2613 -2.569 0.2946 34 -6.529*** 0.0000 -7.061*** 0.0000 
 Austria 34 -4.783*** 0.0005 -4.777*** 0.0005 33 -9.108*** 0.0000 -11.773*** 0.0000 
 Belgium 33 -5.162*** 0.0001 -5.191*** 0.0001 32 -9.391*** 0.0000 -12.912*** 0.0000 
 Brazil 34 -3.416** 0.0493 -3.528** 0.0365 33 -10.282*** 0.0000 -10.316*** 0.0000 
 Bulgaria 26 -5.199*** 0.0001 -5.222*** 0.0001 25 -8.303*** 0.0000 -10.014*** 0.0000 
 Canada 37 -3.545** 0.0349 -3.538** 0.0355 36 -8.056*** 0.0000 -8.569*** 0.0000 
 Chile 32 -3.575** 0.0320 -3.579** 0.0317 31 -7.353*** 0.0000 -8.865***  0.0000 
 China 32 -3.098 0.1068 -3.115 0.1027 31 -5.865*** 0.0000 -5.888*** 0.0000 
 Colombia 32 -3.405* 0.0508 -3.298* 0.0666 31 -5.780*** 0.0000 -6.453*** 0.0000 
 Czech Republic 28 -3.707** 0.0219 -3.714** 0.0215 27 -8.325*** 0.0000 -9.652*** 0.0000 
 Denmark 33 -3.757** 0.0189 -3.796** 0.0168 32 -8.119*** 0.0000 -9.198*** 0.0000 
 Estonia 26 -3.805** 0.0163 -3.762** 0.0186 25 -6.312*** 0.0000 -6.560*** 0.0000 
 Finland 34 -2.752 0.2151 -2.690 0.2402 33 -8.145*** 0.0000 -8.594*** 0.0000 
 France 35 -2.701 0.2356 -2.661 0.2527 34 -6.996*** 0.0000 -7.230*** 0.0000 
 Germany 34 -2.524 0.3163 -2.585 0.2870 33 -6.451*** 0.0000 -6.498*** 0.0000 
 Greece 34 -5.698*** 0.0000 -5.704*** 0.0000 33 -9.280*** 0.0000 -11.941*** 0.0000 
 Hungary 28 -6.099*** 0.0000 -6.440*** 0.0000 27 -9.909*** 0.0000 -11.287*** 0.0000 
 Iceland 23 -1.426 0.8531 -1.739 0.7334 22 -2.904 0.1611 -2.963 0.1428 
 India 32 -3.400* 0.0514 -3.434** 0.0470 31 -6.567*** 0.0000 -6.799*** 0.0000 
 Ireland 33 -3.322* 0.0627 -3.214* 0.0817 32 -5.559*** 0.0000 -5.766*** 0.0000 
 Italy 34 -2.319 0.4233 -2.249 0.4622 33 -5.656*** 0.0000 -5.805*** 0.0000 
 Japan 34 -4.154*** 0.0052 -4.054*** 0.0074 33 -7.033*** 0.0000 -8.450*** 0.0000 
 Latvia 24 -3.789* 0.0171 -3.721** 0.0210 23 -12.572*** 0.0000 -10.602*** 0.0000 
 Lithuania 24 -4.345*** 0.0027 -4.343*** 0.0027 23 -6.395*** 0.0000 -7.069*** 0.0000 
 Luxembourg 33 -5.785*** 0.0000 -5.853*** 0.0000 32 -8.989*** 0.0000 -11.503*** 0.0000 
 Malaysia 32 -3.507** 0.0387 -3.353* 0.0579 31 -8.139*** 0.0000 -10.106***  0.0000 
 Netherlands 35 -3.975*** 0.0095 -3.962** 0.0100 34 -7.356*** 0.0000 -8.062***  0.0000 
 New Zealand 32 -5.847*** 0.0000 -5.829*** 0.0000 31 -10.989*** 0.0000 -13.377***  0.0000 
 Nigeria 22 -4.284*** 0.0033 -4.288*** 0.0033 21 -7.848*** 0.0000 -9.917***  0.0000 
 Norway 33 -3.980*** 0.0094 -3.948** 0.0104 32 -8.066*** 0.0000 -9.802***  0.0000 
 Poland 29 -3.759** 0.0188 -3.604** 0.0295 28 -6.122*** 0.0000 -6.973***  0.0000 
 Portugal 32 -4.413*** 0.0021 -4.414*** 0.0021 31 -9.480*** 0.0000 -11.653***  0.0000 
 Romania 26 -2.835 0.1843 -2.799 0.1975 25 -4.596*** 0.0010 -4.607***  0.0010 
 Russia 27 -3.842** 0.0146 -3.926** 0.0112 26 -11.150*** 0.0000 -12.295***  0.0000 
 Singapore 34 -4.414*** 0.0021 -4.360*** 0.0025 33 -7.841*** 0.0000 -9.095***  0.0000 
 Slovenia 25 -3.483** 0.0413 -3.501** 0.0392 24 -6.837*** 0.0000 -7.139***  0.0000 
 South Africa 29 -3.236* 0.0775 -3.178* 0.0888 28 -6.365*** 0.0000 -6.722***  0.0000 
 South Korea 30 -2.743 0.2187 -2.750 0.2158 29 -6.311*** 0.0000 -6.513***  0.0000 




 Sweden 34 -2.590 0.2847 -2.597 0.2811 33 -5.426*** 0.0000 -5.429***  0.0000 
 Switzerland 35 -4.642*** 0.0009 -4.626*** 0.0009 34 -8.980*** 0.0000 -10.400***  0.0000 
 Thailand 30 -5.655*** 0.0000 -5.656*** 0.0000 29 -9.523*** 0.0000 -12.027***  0.0000 
 Turkey 31 -4.299*** 0.0032 -4.340*** 0.0027 30 -8.625*** 0.0000 -10.072***  0.0000 
 United Kingdom 38 -2.388 0.3861 -2.378 0.3914 37 -5.261*** 0.0001 -5.203***  0.0001 
 United States 41 -2.271 0.4498 -2.511 0.3223 40 -5.040*** 0.0002 -4.970***  0.0002 
 Notes: MacKinnon approximate p-value for Z(t). Trend option is applied to include a constant and time trend. *** p<.01, ** p<.05, * p<.1. 
 
 
Appendix A.V. – Results of Performed Robustness Analyses  
Table A.8. FE OLS Model (solely based on domestic M&A transactions) 
Regression #   (1)   (2)   (3)   (4)   (5)   (6)   (7)   (8) 
Dependent Variable  Δ Top 0.1% 
Income 
Share 
Δ Top 1% 
Income 
Share 
Δ Next 9% 
Income 
Share 
Δ Top 10% 
Income 
Share 
Δ Ratio Top 
1% to Next 
9% 









Key Independent Variable          
Δ rel. M&A Activity 0.00100* 0.00206** 0.00021 0.00235** 0.01041** 0.00352** 0.00043** 0.00031* 
(0.00051) (0.00077) (0.00047) (0.00096) (0.00398) (0.00149) (0.00020) (0.00017) 
Δ rel. M&A Activity 
(squared) 
0.00048** 0.00096*** 0.00028** 0.00121*** 0.00360*** 0.00178** 0.00054*** 0.00029*** 
(0.00022) (0.00032) (0.00013) (0.00041) (0.00131) (0.00066) (0.00008) (0.00010) 
Control Variables          
Δ Stock Market 
Capitalization 
0.00851** 0.01321** -0.00005 0.01298** 0.06043** 0.02418** 0.00151*** 0.00111 
(0.00418) (0.00587) (0.00145) (0.00536) (0.02865) (0.01155) (0.00046) (0.00066) 
Δ log real GDP per 
capita 
0.02524*** 0.03063** -0.02063 0.00971 0.15558*** 0.04871 -0.01219** -0.01494*** 
(0.00639) (0.01414) (0.01823) (0.03084) (0.03862) (0.03861) (0.00504) (0.00455) 
Δ Government 
Spending 
-0.10106*** -0.17268*** 0.01102 -0.18824*** -0.87681*** -0.37552*** -0.00666 0.00152 
(0.02846) (0.03503) (0.03971) (0.04037) (0.20465) (0.06517) (0.00701) (0.00774) 
Δ Unemployment Rate 0.00445 0.00080 -0.00156 0.00059 -0.00384 -0.00317 0.02571*** 0.04204*** 
(0.01009) (0.01746) (0.01907) (0.03209) (0.05788) (0.04243) (0.00831) (0.01427) 
Δ Trade Volume 0.00122 0.00526 0.00165 0.00645 0.00930 0.01206 -0.00147 -0.00027 
(0.00329) (0.00488) (0.00621) (0.00945) (0.01926) (0.01184) (0.00105) (0.00082) 
Δ Age Dependency 
Ratio 
-0.00415 -0.01888 -0.09092 -0.11421 0.13533 -0.06723 -0.04079 -0.01515 
(0.04434) (0.07589) (0.05751) (0.09594) (0.33330) (0.15812) (0.03049) (0.04075) 
Constant -0.00360*** -0.00589*** 0.00245*** 0.00323** 0.00073 -0.01199*** 0.00324*** 0.00038 
(0.00077) (0.00132) (0.00068) (0.00121) (0.00459) (0.00277) (0.00064) (0.00080) 
Observations 1159 1159 1147 1147 1147 1142 1215 1215 
R-squared (within) 0.08532 0.10685 0.03924 0.09200 0.11251 0.08196 0.12600 0.19650 
Country fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Time fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Notes: Driscoll and Kraay standard errors are in parentheses *** p<.01, ** p<.05, * p<.1   
 
 
Table A.9. FE OLS Model with alternative measures 
Regression #   (1)   (2)   (3)   (4)   (5)   (6)   (7)   (8) 
Dependent Variable  Δ Top 0.1% 
Income 
Share 
Δ Top 1% 
Income 
Share 
Δ Next 9% 
Income 
Share 
Δ Top 10% 
Income 
Share 
Δ Ratio Top 
1% to Next 
9% 









Panel A – Private Credit          
Δ rel. M&A Activity 0.00118 0.00212 0.00010 0.00224 0.01032 0.00377 0.00024 0.00016 
(0.00087) (0.00141) (0.00048) (0.00150) (0.00719) (0.00242) (0.00015) (0.00012) 
Δ rel. M&A Activity 
(squared) 
0.00020 0.00045** 0.00018*** 0.00061*** 0.00153* 0.00086** 0.00024*** 0.00014** 
(0.00012) (0.00018) (0.00005) (0.00020) (0.00085) (0.00034) (0.00004) (0.00005) 
Control Variables  -0.00339 -0.00728 -0.00209 -0.00961 -0.02507 -0.01713 0.00191 0.00181 
Δ Private Credit (0.00468) (0.00755) (0.00201) (0.00798) (0.03610) (0.01299) (0.00142) (0.00171) 
Observations 1239 1239 1227 1227 1227 1222 1298 1298 
R-squared (within) 0.07093 0.08480 0.03744 0.07230 0.09124 0.06698 0.12475 0.20055 
         
Panel B – Total 
Financial Development 
        
Δ rel. M&A Activity 0.00114* 0.00208* 0.00015 0.00226* 0.01019* 0.00367* 0.00027*** 0.00017 
(0.00067) (0.00114) (0.00048) (0.00130) (0.00581) (0.00201) (0.00009) (0.00013) 
Δ rel. M&A Activity 
(squared) 
0.00014 0.00033* 0.00013** 0.00045** 0.00115 0.00060* 0.00024*** 0.00013** 
(0.00011) (0.00017) (0.00006) (0.00020) (0.00074) (0.00033) (0.00004) (0.00005) 
Δ Total Financial 
Development 
0.00510 0.00743 -0.00042 0.00681 0.03579 0.01267 0.00166*** 0.00130** 
(0.00365) (0.00526) (0.00127) (0.00510) (0.02617) (0.00996) (0.00029) (0.00055) 
Observations 1148 1148 1136 1136 1136 1131 1204 1204 
R-squared (within) 0.07776 0.09637 0.03962 0.08350 0.10227 0.07371 0.12875 0.20169 
         
Panel C – KOF Trade 
Globalization Index 
        
Δ rel. M&A Activity 0.00108 0.00211* 0.00020 0.00232** 0.00977* 0.00377* 0.00019* 0.00015 
(0.00065) (0.00105) (0.00027) (0.00110) (0.00541) (0.00186) (0.00010) (0.00011) 
Δ rel. M&A Activity 
(squared) 
0.00021* 0.00041** 0.00015*** 0.00056*** 0.00155** 0.00078** 0.00027*** 0.00014*** 
(0.00011) (0.00016) (0.00005) (0.00019) (0.00075) (0.00032) (0.00003) (0.00005) 
Δ KOF Trade 
Globalization Index 
0.00004 0.00009 -0.00004 0.00004 0.00025 0.00029 0.00002 0.00011*** 
(0.00011) (0.00016) (0.00009) (0.00018) (0.00078) (0.00033) (0.00003) (0.00003) 
Observations 1076 1076 1064 1064 1064 1059 1114 1114 
R-squared (within) 0.09233 0.11132 0.03856 0.09664 0.11705 0.08542 0.12513 0.19615 





Table A.10. FE OLS Model with additional measures  
Regression #   (1)   (2)   (3)   (4)   (5)   (6)   (7)   (8) 
Dependent Variable  Δ Top 0.1% 
Income 
Share 
Δ Top 1% 
Income 
Share 
Δ Next 9% 
Income 
Share 
Δ Top 10% 
Income 
Share 
Δ Ratio Top 
1% to Next 
9% 









Panel A – Top Statutory 
Income Tax Rate  
        
Δ rel. M&A Activity 0.00023 0.00085 0.00017 0.00103 0.00447 0.00088 0.00027 0.00021 
(0.00036) (0.00058) (0.00018) (0.00062) (0.00259) (0.00105) (0.00020) (0.00014) 
Δ rel. M&A Activity 
(squared) 
0.00027** 0.00051** 0.00017*** 0.00067*** 0.00181** 0.00104*** 0.00021*** 0.00009*** 
(0.00012) (0.00018) (0.00006) (0.00021) (0.00069) (0.00034) (0.00003) (0.00003) 
Δ Top Statutory Income 
Tax Rate 
-0.03486** -0.03979* 0.00056 -0.03923 -0.21053** -0.06642 -0.00202 0.00988 
(0.01313) (0.01932) (0.01118) (0.02610) (0.08858) (0.03932) (0.00327) (0.00600) 
Observations 512 512 512 512 512 512 510 510 
R-squared (within) 0.20330 0.22315 0.03405 0.18957 0.22286 0.19184 0.09391 0.23030 
         
Panel B – Taxes and 
Government Ideology  
        
Δ rel. M&A Activity 0.00042 0.00127* 0.00015 0.00142* 0.00621* 0.00184 0.00033* 0.00028** 
(0.00041) (0.00065) (0.00023) (0.00075) (0.00295) (0.00116) (0.00018) (0.00012) 
Δ rel. M&A Activity 
(squared) 
0.00028** 0.00049** 0.00011* 0.00060** 0.00185** 0.00100** 0.00020*** 0.00009** 
(0.00013) (0.00019) (0.00006) (0.00023) (0.00075) (0.00037) (0.00004) (0.00003) 
Δ Top Statutory Income 
Tax Rate * Government 
Ideology (left) 
-0.10270*** -0.14460*** -0.01695 -0.16155*** -0.57421*** -0.32915*** -0.01881 0.00180 
(0.02018) (0.02949) (0.02515) (0.04122) (0.12115) (0.06039) (0.01119) (0.01309) 
Δ Top Statutory Income 
Tax Rate * Government 
Ideology (center) 
0.10534*** 0.16139*** 0.01949 0.18088** 0.64833*** 0.37507*** 0.01377 -0.00035 
(0.03048) (0.04888) (0.02295) (0.06556) (0.18927) (0.09665) (0.02172) (0.01847) 
Δ Top Statutory Income 
Tax Rate * Government 
Ideology (right) 
0.11449*** 0.16514*** 0.02547 0.19061*** 0.63627*** 0.38452*** 0.01906 0.00789 
(0.02982) (0.04021) (0.02086) (0.03928) (0.17801) (0.08211) (0.01308) (0.01928) 
Observations 426 426 426 426 426 426 426 426 
R-squared (within) 0.24030 0.27559 0.03867 0.24074 0.25658 0.26551 0.12024 0.28621 
         
Panel C – Agriculture 
Share 
        
Δ rel. M&A Activity 0.00099 0.00187* 0.00015 0.00207* 0.00944* 0.00322* 0.00022** 0.00014 
(0.00062) (0.00102) (0.00050) (0.00120) (0.00539) (0.00180) (0.00009) (0.00012) 
Δ rel. M&A Activity 
(squared) 
0.00020 0.00041** 0.00015* 0.00054** 0.00144* 0.00076* 0.00021*** 0.00007** 
(0.00013) (0.00019) (0.00009) (0.00024) (0.00078) (0.00038) (0.00003) (0.00003) 
Δ Agriculture Share -0.05154* -0.05886 0.00839 -0.06646* -0.37045* -0.14152 -0.01077 -0.01095 
(0.02693) (0.04151) (0.03025) (0.03493) (0.21725) (0.09049) (0.00907) (0.00998) 
Observations 1045 1045 1033 1033 1033 1033 1101 1101 
R-squared (within) 0.08409 0.10498 0.03528 0.09185 0.11214 0.08180 0.11876 0.19277 
         
Panel C – Patent 
Applications 
        
Δ rel. M&A Activity 0.00093 0.00173* 0.00005 0.00182 0.00898 0.00292 0.00029*** 0.00020* 
 (0.00061) (0.00099) (0.00055) (0.00114) (0.00535) (0.00179) (0.00009) (0.00011) 
Δ rel. M&A Activity 
(squared) 
0.00020* 0.00042** 0.00016* 0.00056*** 0.00151** 0.00078** 0.00024*** 0.00010** 
(0.00011) (0.00016) (0.00008) (0.00021) (0.00067) (0.00032) (0.00004) (0.00004) 
Δ Patent Applications -0.00080 -0.00194 -0.00186 -0.00397 -0.00426 -0.00482 -0.00064 -0.00074 
 (0.00182) (0.00247) (0.00150) (0.00281) (0.00899) (0.00571) (0.00055) (0.00059) 
Observations 1076 1076 1064 1064 1064 1059 1130 1130 
R-squared (within) 0.08605 0.10860 0.05131 0.10006 0.11373 0.08483 0.13412 0.18707 
Notes: Driscoll and Kraay standard errors are in parentheses *** p<.01, ** p<.05, * p<.1. All regression specifications include country- and year-fixed effects.   
 
